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ABSTRACT
Screening individuals for concealed knowledge has traditionally been the
purview of professional interrogators investigating a crime. But the ability to detect
when a person is hiding important information would be of high value to many
other fields and functions. This dissertation proposes design principles for and
reports on an implementation and empirical evaluation of a non-invasive,
automated system for human screening. The screening system design (termed an
automated screening kiosk or ASK) is patterned after a standard interviewing
method called the Concealed Information Test (CIT), which is built on theories
explaining psychophysiological and behavioral effects of human orienting and
defensive responses. As part of testing the ASK proof of concept, I propose and
empirically examine alternative indicators of concealed knowledge in a CIT.
Specifically, I propose kinesic rigidity as a viable cue, propose and instantiate an
automated method for capturing rigidity, and test its viability using a traditional CIT
experiment. I also examine oculomotor behavior using a mock security screening
experiment using an ASK system design. Participants in this second experiment
packed a fake improvised explosive device (IED) in a bag and were screened by an
ASK system. Results indicate that the ASK design, if implemented within a highly
controlled framework such as the CIT, has potential to overcome barriers to more
widespread application of concealed knowledge testing in government and business
settings.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

The most difficult type of information to obtain is often that which is
intentionally kept hidden. Yet hidden information is often the most valuable. The
perceived ability to successfully conceal information motivates individuals to hide
poor performance, commit fraud, and even engage in acts of terrorism. For decades
Bernie Madoff successfully concealed the fact that his financial service was secretly
a Ponzi scheme—resulting in a price tag of over $64 billion (Graybow, 2009). No one
on board the aircraft knew Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab had smuggled explosives
aboard, which act nearly cost the lives of 289 individuals (United States of America
vs. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 2010).
The discovery of high-value, purposely concealed information is an
important topic in many fields. Financial fraud detection usually involves searching
for deliberately concealed data. Criminal forensics and criminal investigations often
include searching for evidence that was deliberately hidden. Cyber security involves
seeking purposely concealed malware and other concealed intrusions (Morales,
2008).
Hidden information is of interest to more than just criminal detection
organizations. Retail establishments seek ways to unveil each customer’s
willingness to pay. Employee recruitment and evaluation teams desire to discover
hidden malicious intentions or policy non-compliance. Large event planning and
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management personnel need methods of screening people for potential security
threats.

1.1 Security Screening Methods
Though the theory, protocol, and system design in this paper may be applied
to many of these contexts, I chose to focus much of this study on human security
screening. In this paper I refer to security screening as the evaluation and
containment of potential human threats, prior to physical entry of a building,
territory, or area of interest. I refer to security screening methods as tactics
employed to generate an evaluation. Metal detector scans, official documentation
evaluations, and simple questioning techniques are common examples of security
screening methods.
Screening methods have become increasingly costly, time-consuming, and
intrusive; yet, performance levels remain considerably lower than desired (Bandyk,
2010). The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) processed over
267 million incoming border crossings in 2008 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
2008), but estimated a 71.1% failure rate when it came to apprehending “major
violations” of laws, rules, and regulations (Department of Homeland Security, 2009).
Air passenger violations were reportedly apprehended only 25% of time
(Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Anecdotal evidence indicates that the
problem is not simply overlooking minor infractions: DHS undercover personnel
attempting to smuggle explosive devices through security screening at a Newark
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airport succeeded in 90% of trials, and failure rates were as high as 70% during
similar penetration tests at Los Angeles and Chicago airports (Mosk, Hill, & Fleming,
2010). Given the enormity of the consequences of poor security screening, a
promising research opportunity exists to improve these methods.
In the extant literature, several studies have addressed improving security
screening methods. Studies have investigated improving operational design to more
efficiently allocate resources (Cavusoglu, Koh, & Raghunathan, 2010; Lee &
Jacobson, 2011; Menneer, Cave, & Donnelly, 2009; Wang & Zhuang, 2011),
enhancing sensors for detecting illicit items (Fainberg, 1992; S.-W. Park, Yuk, Ryu,
Kim, & Yi, 2006; Vassiliades, Evans, Kaufman, Chan, & Downes, 2008), and
improving decision support and screener decision making tools (Jensen, Lowry,
Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2010; Jensen, Lowry, Burgoon, & Nunamaker Jr., 2011; G.
Park & DeShon, 2010; Twyman, Jenkins, Carl, & Nunamaker Jr., 2011).
Though these streams of security screening research have greatly
contributed to practice, they stop short of addressing as-yet unknown threats.
Namely, current screening systems tend to be reactionary in nature: they are
designed and redesigned to detect only that which has already been discovered
through prior experience (Nakanishi, 2008). Accordingly, they do not include
mechanisms for preventing threats that have yet to be discovered. In this area,
human security screening lags behind related research areas such as fraud detection
(Cecchini, Aytug, Koehler, & Pathak, 2010; Holton, 2009; Humpherys, Moffitt, Burns,
Burgoon, & Felix, 2011), behavior-based virus detection (Morales, 2008), intrusion
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prevention (Green, Raz, & Zviran, 2007; Ryu & Rhee, 2008), and cyberterrorism
prevention research (Hansen, Lowry, Meservy, & McDonald, 2007) that have begun
developing techniques that could be used to avert illegal or undesirable actions that
have not been previously committed.

1.2 Veracity Assessment Tools for Illuminating Unknown Threats
This inability to screen for the unexpected can be addressed by integrating
elements of veracity assessment research with security screening protocols. In
recent years, some IS research has proposed advanced tools for veracity assessment
(e.g., D. C. Derrick, Elkins, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Zeng, 2010; Fukuda, 2001;
Meservy et al., 2005; Twyman, Elkins, & Burgoon, 2011; Twyman, Moffitt, Burgoon,
& Marchak, 2010). Though few studies have targeted security screening specifically,
research results on these tools suggest the possibility of recognizing threats on a
more abstract level. For instance, natural language processing tools have been
designed to predict the likelihood of financial fraud, even though the exact nature of
the fraud may be undefined (Glancy & Yadav, 2011; Humpherys, et al., 2011). In
addition to linguistic analyses, IS veracity assessment research has investigated
other tools such as body movement analyses, vocalic feature analyses, pupillometry,
thermal measurement, and noncontact cardiorespiratory measures (D. C. Derrick, et
al., 2010; Meservy, Jensen, Kruse, Burgoon, Nunamaker, et al., 2005). This research
has demonstrated the potential value of certain tools, showing that systems can
improve accuracy and can automate processes.
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However, these tools cannot be equally applied to every situation. Cues to
deception are likely to be heavily influenced by many factors. Psychology, criminal
justice, and communication research on deception detection demonstrates that
when it comes to screening, the protocol used to assess veracity can be just as
important as the cue or measurement (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, & Kronkvist,
2006; Levine, Shaw, & Shulman, 2010). The effectiveness of a given tool for
measuring veracity is influenced by factors such as interviewer skill (Iacono, 2008)
and crime-related knowledge (E. Elaad, 1997), the level of synchrony in the
communication (Humpherys, et al., 2011; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell,
2004), and even the type of questions asked (J. K. Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, &
Rockwell, 1994; Moffitt, 2011). Thus, a natural step forward in this field of research
is to design and test screening systems that are rooted in procedures and theories
that are well-established and generalizable. To establish validity and reliability in
automated human security screening, methods and processes need to be researched
in conjunction with effective technologies.
To address these opportunities in security screening research, this study
proposes and evaluates an automated security screening system design that is
based on a modified version of a successful screening technique called the
Concealed Information Test (CIT; Lykken, 1974). Rather than scanning for the threat
itself, the system searches for hidden threats at a more abstract level, by asking each
individual several questions while recording psychophysiological and behavioral
responses, similar to the common lie-detector test (i.e. “polygraph”) (Lykken, 1998;
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Raskin & Honts, 2002). This system design is similar in concept to behavior-based
computer virus detection, which analyzes the behavior of programs looking for
suspicious activity rather than only looking for specific virus signatures (e.g., Kim,
Shin, & Pillai, 2011; Morales, 2008; O'Kane, Sezer, & McLaughlin, 2011).
A well-designed screening system for detecting intentionally concealed
knowledge could be useful in any situation where the discovery of such information
would be valuable. For instance, criminal investigations can benefit from knowing
which suspects possess crucial information. Job applications could be accompanied
by an objective integrity evaluation. Retraining courses could be personalized for
corporate policy topics for which employees prefer not to reveal ignorance or noncompliance. Physical building security could be enhanced. These considerations
inspire the research question:
What are design principles for a system and protocol for automated screening
of individuals for concealed knowledge?

As the ensuing discussion will show, the investigation into this research
question revealed that non-traditional indicators of concealed information are
needed. I investigate three potential indicators, two of which are novel to CIT and
deception detection research. Thus, in addition to outlining a screening system
design, a secondary research question for this work is as follows:
How can measurement of kinesic, oculomotor, and vocalic behaviors serve as
automated alternative indicators of concealed knowledge?
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The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: existing standard
interviewing techniques are reviewed, and justification is provided for using the CIT
as a foundation for this study and system design. Following this is a narrative that
introduces and explains how oculomotor (eye movement-based) patterns, body
movement rigidity, and response time can serve as indicators of concealed
information. The experiments used to investigate alternative indicators and the
potential of a CIT-based screening system are then reviewed and results reported.
Included in the discussion of the final experiment is a description of an implemented
automated screening system termed an automated screening kiosk (ASK), which
was evaluated in the experiment. The final experiment involved having participants
build a mock improvised explosive device (IED) and try to smuggle it through a
security screening station that implemented the ASK. Following the reported results
of these experiments is a discussion of the implications for research and practice
together with future research directions.

1.3 Background on Standardized Interviewing Techniques
As noted, studies investigating veracity assessment and screening tools
illuminate the value of a standardized screening process (Hartwig, et al., 2006;
Humpherys, et al., 2011; Levine, et al., 2010; Moffitt, 2011). Standardized
interviewing techniques such as the CIT have historically been used to assess the
veracity of persons under investigation for their involvement in a crime or other
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illicit activity by asking particular questions and measuring physiological and
behavioral responses (Gamer, Verschuere, Crombez, & Vossel, 2008; MacLaren,
2001). Several standardized interpersonal screening techniques are currently used
regularly by practitioners, the most common of which include the Control Question
Test (CQT), the Behavioral Analysis Interview (BAI), and the CIT (Vrij, 2008). I
briefly overview these here; Vrij’s (2008) compilation contains a more in-depth
review.
The CQT is currently the most commonly used interviewing technique for
veracity assessment (Vrij, 2008). The CQT takes several hours to complete, and
requires a high level of skill on the part of the interviewer to obtain valid results.
The interviewer in the main phase of the CQT asks several control questions that
every person is likely to lie about (e.g., “Have you ever taken something that does
not belong to you?”), and several questions that are directly relevant to the crime or
illicit act (e.g., “Did you steal the car?”). Before doing this, the interviewer must lead
the examinee to believe that admitting to such a question would necessarily show
that he or she is the type of person who would commit the crime or illicit act that is
the subject of the CQT. This manipulation is necessary to ensure that an innocent
examinee will experience more arousal when presented with these control
questions than about crime-relevant questions, whereas a guilty examinee will
experience equal or more arousal during the relevant question (Meijer &
Verschuere, 2010; Raskin & Honts, 2002). Though commonly used in practice, the
CQT is criticized as having a weak theoretical foundation by academic researchers
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(Ben-Shakhar, 2002; Iacono, 2000; Lykken, 1998; Meijer & Verschuere, 2010; Vrij,
2008)—most notably the United States National Research Council (2003). Among
the major research concerns cited are the inability to measure objectively whether
the interviewer has successfully manipulated the interviewee (Fiedler, Schmid, &
Stahl, 2002; Iacono, 2008; Lykken, 1998), and uncertainty as to whether
psychophysiological indicators can reliably distinguish between a guilty person’s
fear of being caught and an innocent person’s fear of false detection (Meijer &
Verschuere, 2010).
The BAI is a method of interviewing sponsored primarily by a single
practitioner group (John E. Reid & Associates, 2011). It is probably the second most
common interviewing technique used in the United States (Vrij, 2008). The BAI
interviewer asks a series of 15-16 standard questions designed to elicit certain
verbal and non-verbal responses. Developers of the BAI posit that truth-tellers and
deceivers should react differently to these questions as a result of differing attitudes
toward the crime or event in question (Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley, 1994; Inbau, Reid,
Buckley, & Jayne, 2001). For instance, during what is termed the “motive” question
(e.g., “Why do you think someone stole the car?”), guilty examinees are expected to
show posture shifts or foot bouncing as a means of reducing a high level of anxiety
which purportedly should not be present in innocent examinees. Aside from an
initial positive evaluation (Horvath, et al., 1994), little direct scientific investigation
validates the BAI. A few direct investigations challenge the validity of the BAI (Blair
& Kooi, 2004; Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006), though the ecological validity of these
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studies has been called into question (Horvath, Blair, & Buckley, 2008). The most
recent BAI investigation suggests that portions of the BAI do show promise
(Horvath, et al., 2008). The mechanisms underlying the BAI remain underexplored,
and much more research is needed before validity of the BAI can be established
(Blair & Kooi, 2004; Horvath, et al., 2008).
As noted, the CIT is an interviewing technique used to determine whether an
examinee is concealing knowledge (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Lykken, 1959). The
CIT actually predates the CQT: the concept was first described in 1908 by
Münsterberg (Münsterberg, 1908). But research on the concept did not move
forward until much later when Lykken labeled it and proposed it as a more viable
alternative to contemporary techniques. In a standard CIT, an interviewer recites
several prepared questions or statements regarding the activity (e.g., crime) in
question. Prepared with each question are several plausible answers, collectively
called a foil, which are also recited by the interviewer. For instance, if the activity in
question is the theft of a vehicle, one of the CIT questions might read: “If you were
involved in the theft of the vehicle, you would know the color of the car that was
stolen. Repeat after me these car colors.” The interviewer would then verbally recite
each item in the associated foil, which would consist of about four to six colors, only
one of which would be the correct color. The examinee is usually asked to either
repeat the items or reply with a verbal “yes” or “no” after each item is spoken by the
interviewer. Once the examinee has spoken, the interviewee and interviewer sit in
silence for several seconds while psychophysiological measurements are recorded.
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Though not as commonly used by practitioners as the CQT or BAI,
researchers widely consider the CIT to be the most scientifically valid approach
(Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Fiedler, et al., 2002; Iacono & Lykken, 1997; National
Research Council, 2003). Unlike the CQT, BAI, and similar techniques, the CIT does
not rely heavily on the capabilities of the interviewer. Instead, the CIT interviewer
plays only a minor role—requiring little to no skill. Moreover, an innocent person’s
fear of detection should not affect the outcome in a CIT, because responses to all
items should be consistent whether their general arousal level is low or high. For
instance, if the relevant (correct) response to the example CIT question above was
“blue,” an innocent person’s fear of being falsely classified should create no different
effect than when the response is “green,” “white,” or any other option, simply
because they have no knowledge of which option is correct.
Table 1 summarizes the standard interviewing methods for detecting
concealed information.
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CQT

2-4
hours**

Low
Validity

BAI

15-45
minutes***

Uncertain;
Nuanced

Practitioner
Usage

High
Validity

Inter-viewer
Skill Level
Required

2-15
minutes*

Most
Common
Criterion for
Assessment

Scientific
Consensus
on Validity

CIT

Interviewing
Technique

Time
Required to
Conduct
Interview

Table 1. Standard Interviewing Methods used for Detecting Concealed
Information

Presence of elevated
orienting response
following onset of
relevant stimulus
Presence of elevated
psychophysiological
response during
relevant question(s)
Expert analysis of
verbal and nonverbal behavior
during interview

Very
Low

Limited to Japan and
some use in Israel
(Nakayama, 2002;
Vrij, 2008)
Widespread use in
North America, Asia,
and Europe (Vrij,
2008)
Used in the United
States including some
business applications;
also some
international use
(John E. Reid &
Associates, 2011)

High

High

*Exact time is a function of how many questions are used (usually between 3 and 6).
**Estimated from a subjective review of polygraph examiner practitioner promotional material.
***Lower bound estimate based on amount of time required to minimally ask and respond to all BAI
questions. Upper bound estimate reflects potential for follow up questions.
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2.

HOW THE CONCEALED INFORMATION TEST CAN BE
ADAPTED FOR SCREENING SYSTEMS
Whereas aspects of each interviewing technique have potential application to

automated screening systems, the CIT has several unique advantages that made it
the clear choice for the protocol portion of an automated screening system design.
First, it requires the least time and little interviewer skill or intervention, which not
only helps to control for interviewer effects but also makes automation easier. The
CIT also generates the strongest within-subjects baseline for comparison.
Additional advantages of the CIT stem from its foil structure and length. Each
foil is self-contained; a system or evaluator can use a single foil to make a judgment.
However, the use of multiple foils reduces the probability of false detects, as long as
each foil is associated with a question that is central to the hidden knowledge in
question (Carmel, Dayan, Naveh, Raveh, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003). The low ratio of
relevant to non-relevant options within each foil (usually between 1:3 and 1:6)
creates a strong baseline that is both person- and question-specific. The CIT process
requires much less time compared to other techniques such as the BAI. Evaluators
can complete several foils in a matter of minutes, whereas alternative techniques
can last hours.
The veracity assessment literature offers three main criticisms of the CIT.
These limitations have been reported to be the main reasons the CIT has not
enjoyed more widespread adoption in law enforcement practices, as reviews of
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cases revealed that only a small percentage of criminal cases are reported to meet
the necessary criteria (Podlesny, 1993, 2003). To the extent these concerns can be
addressed, the CIT could be applied more generally. However, it should be noted
that weaknesses exist in the method Podlesny used in the above-cited studies
(Meijer & Verschuere, 2010), and in spite of these challenges, Japan has widely
adopted this technique for investigations (Hira & Furumitsu, 2002; Nakayama,
2002). Still, these criticisms remain the main arguments against wider adoption.
First, the preparation phase for the CIT is more time-consuming and
complicated compared to alternative interviewing techniques. Critical foil items
have to be designed from a pool of information that is known and knowable only by
the perpetrator of the illicit act. This process can be difficult and sometimes it is
impossible to identify enough usable items for testing. When critical foil items are
identified, a lack of familiarity to innocent parties should be established through
pretesting, and non-critical foil items must be pretested as well, all of which can be
too costly for a single investigation. However, the nature of human screening is often
such that hundreds or sometimes thousands of examinees could undergo the same
test in a given location and context, minimizing the relative cost of preparation.
The second criticism is the requirement that guilty knowledge be possessed
by only the guilty party, or innocent persons will be improperly accused (Bradley,
MacLaren, & Carle, 1996). In security screening, it is plausible that an individual
may know of a specific crime in progress, even though he or she is not directly
involved. To the extent that this occurs, a rapid screening CIT will face this same
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difficulty. The National Research Council suggests that this may be addressed by
treating the response variables more on a scale rather than as a dichotomy
(National Research Council, 2003). Their suggestion rests on the assumption that
guilty knowledge will be more poignant with the responsible party than with a
witness—an assumption that needs further investigation (Gamer, 2010).
The third criticism of the CIT is similar to the second. For an orienting
response to occur, a reasonably strong certainty must exist that the critical items
chosen for CIT foils have a high degree of personal significance in the mind of the
guilty suspect; otherwise, the difference in response between guilty and innocent
suspects will not be as diagnostic (Carmel, et al., 2003; Gati & Ben-Shakhar, 1990).
Ensuring this link is especially difficult when little direct information about the
crime or event is known, or when a large amount of time has lapsed between the
event and the investigation (Honts, 2004). In a security screening scenario, this
concern is minimized. The particulars of the event(s) are well understood, because
they are pre-specified. For instance, examinees are usually aware of a list of banned
items for which they are being screened. Time is unlikely to be a concern, because in
screening scenarios the malicious event is in progress (e.g., smuggling) or is
intended (e.g., theft) rather than a distant memory; thus, the event is sure to have
personal significance to a guilty examinee.
Aside from these criticisms, a practical challenge exists in using the CIT or
any of the standard interviewing techniques as the basis for a screening system. The
standard measurements typically used in these techniques require sensors that
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must be strapped on or otherwise physically connected to the examinee. These
invasive sensors require human intervention and monitoring, which requires
additional time and undermines some of the benefits of automation. To the extent a
CIT system design could overcome these challenges, its usefulness in discovering
hidden information can be extended not only to security screening, but also to
applications ranging from internal auditing to anti-terrorism.

2.1 Design Principles for Automated Screening for Concealed
Guilty Knowledge
Several general design principles for an automated screening system and
process for discovering purposely concealed knowledge can be derived from the
previous review. The design principles I propose for such systems follow:
1. Identify appropriate stimuli that represent the concealed knowledge in
question. Ensure there is reasonably strong certainty that the
representation has relatively high personal significance for a person who
is concealing such knowledge.
2. Identify irrelevant stimuli that arouse the same baseline level of orienting
and defensive responses (discussed in the next section).
3. Develop several foils consisting of relevant and irrelevant stimuli in a
one-to-many ratio.
4. Automatically present these foils in an environment where potential
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distractions are at a minimum, including but not limited to human
distractions.
5. During foil presentation, automatically capture human indicators of the
orienting and/or defensive responses.
6. Apply categorization algorithms to the collected data to assess concealed
knowledge.

While each design principle is an important component of an automated
screening system design, this research focuses mostly on advancing principles 4 and
5. However, the system design proposed later in this document will be evaluated
against each of the six principles.
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3.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE AUTOMATED
DETECTION OF CONCEALED KNOWLEDGE USING THE
CONCEALED INFORMATION TEST (CIT)
This section explains the theoretical foundation of the CIT and how the CIT

can be used to detect concealed knowledge about adverse events, including the
presence of those that may not have been identified as yet. The theory underlying
the CIT has traditionally centered on the orienting response. In extending CIT
research to automated screening for hidden knowledge applications, I also
incorporate defensive response theory and related theories used in veracity
assessment literature.

3.1 The Orienting Reflex
The CIT draws on the orienting reflex, which is the autonomic movement of
attention toward novel or personally significant stimuli (Pavlov, 1927; Sokolov,
1963). The level of stimulus novelty is a function of the degree to which it matches
(or does not match) stimuli that precede it in a given context (Gati & Ben-Shakhar,
1990). The level of personal significance is a function of the degree to which a
stimulus matches one’s cognitive representation of a given item of relevant
information (Gati & Ben-Shakhar, 1990). When an individual’s autonomic system
registers a novel or personally significant stimulus, the sympathetic portion of the
nervous system activates to mobilize the body to a state of readiness (i.e., arousal)
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so that the individual is ready to adapt or react to the stimulus (National Research
Council, 2003; Pavlov, 1927; Sokolov, 1963; Verschuere, Crombez, Clercq, & Koster,
2004).
The orienting reflex is an autonomic response that creates measurable
physiological effects (Ambach, Bursch, Stark, & Vaitl, 2010; Gamer, et al., 2008;
Lykken, 1974). This readiness to adapt includes physiological changes such as
variance in heart rate, skin sweatiness, pupil dilation, and respiration (Ambach, et
al., 2010; Eitan Elaad & Ben-Shakhar, 2009; Lykken, 1959). Stimuli that have
stronger relevance or “signal value” (Lykken, 1974, p. 728) such as an out-of-place
object or hearing one’s own name (Cherry, 1953) produce a stronger orienting
reflex (Bernstein, 1979; Maltzman, 1979). With repeated presentations of stimuli,
the magnitude of the reflex decreases as a function of the corresponding decrease in
novelty and personal significance (Sokolov, 1963). Figure 1 depicts the process of
orienting reflex activation.

Presented Stimulus

Novelty

Personal
Significance

Sympathetic
Nervous System
Activation

Figure 1. Depiction of the Orienting Reflex

Arousal
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As noted, the CIT uses several multiple choice questions, with only one
relevant (i.e., correct) answer per question. Knowledge regarding the correct
alternative serves as additional “signal value,” which activates the orienting reflex
much more strongly than that seen in irrelevant (no “signal value”) alternatives
(Lykken, 1974). In the CIT, two basic outcomes are compared. The physiological
responses that follow presentation of a relevant stimulus are compared to the
physiological responses that follow presentation of the several irrelevant stimuli
(Gamer, et al., 2008).
The key to successful execution of the CIT is thus to identify stimuli that are
relevant only to the guilty party. Traditionally, the knowledge in question is related
directly to a crime or similar event, which knowledge usually activates guilt, fear, or
similar arousal when accessed. These traditional applications helped inspire the
original technique label—the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) (Ben-Shakhar, Bar-Hillel,
& Kremnitzer, 2002; Lykken, 1959, 1974; Podlesny, 1993). However, the CIT has
also been used successfully to uncover hidden knowledge unassociated with highly
charged emotions, such as hiding knowledge of a playing card (Fukuda, 2001;
Gamer, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vossel, 2007). The phrase “concealed information”
rather than “guilty knowledge” has become the phrasing of choice, even though
most practical applications of the CIT still focus on knowledge highly associated
with guilt.
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3.2 When Stimuli are Threatening
Though it has received somewhat less attention in CIT research, there is
another mechanism examinees usually exhibit called the defensive response.
Whereas the orienting reflex can occur with any stimulus of sufficient novelty or
personal significance, the defensive response is a reaction only to stimuli perceived
to be aversive or threatening. This reaction includes physiological and behavioral
changes.
The defensive response was initially coined the “fight-or-flight” behavior in
the early 20th century (Walter B. Cannon, 1929). The defensive response can be
broken up into at least two phases—an initial defensive reflex followed by defensive
behaviors. When threatening stimuli are first perceived, an initial sympathetic
nervous system activation occurs—driving a defensive physiological reaction
thought to help the individual assess the threat and determine the appropriate
action to take (Sokolov, 1963; Verschuere, et al., 2004). Many of the physiological
changes associated with this initial defensive reflex are similar to the orienting reflex
(e.g. a sudden increase in skin sweatiness) (Verschuere, et al., 2004), though there
are differences in cardiovascular response. In CIT research, this reflex stage of the
defensive response is thought to amplify many of the physiological measures of the
orienting reflex.
The initial defensive reflex transitions into behaviors designed to escape or
combat the threat (W. B. Cannon, 1914; Gray, 1988). For the purpose of this paper I
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term these defensive behaviors to distinguish them from the defensive reflex.
Behaviors that stem from responding to a threat are not necessarily autonomic, and
may be driven by subconscious or conscious mechanisms. Defensive behaviors are
driven by a perceived threat, and therefore can be different than behavioral
reactions to stimuli perceived to be non-threatening (Ambach, Stark, Peper, & Vaitl,
2008). Though absent from CIT research, these defensive behaviors have been the
focus of much research in veracity assessment literature. Veracity assessment
literature has documented various “fight or flight” tactics individuals consciously or
subconsciously employ when an important deception is under threat of discovery.
For instance, a tendency to freeze or become more rigid has been documented (Vrij,
Semin, & Bull, 1996). Other behaviors include avoiding direct answers, attempting
to distract the evaluator, and/or controlling message content and nonverbal
behavior so as to appear truthful (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O'Brien, 1988).
Deception detection literature has shown that sometimes these defensive behaviors
themselves can indicate deception. Sometimes these defensive behaviors are
insufficient or unsuccessful, and cues indicating a deception “leak” out thereby
exposing the individual. Figure 2 depicts the defensive response to a perceived
threat.
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Figure 2. Depiction of defensive responding.

I propose that defensive behaviors can be valuable input for discovering
concealed knowledge. In the CIT, aversive or threatening stimuli are those foil items
that have potential to expose concealed knowledge about the incident that the
individual wishes to keep hidden. When presented with the aversive stimuli,
individuals should exhibit defensive behaviors designed to escape or combat the
threat. The same stimuli should have no such effect on individuals who do not find
the stimuli aversive. Thus, behavior modifications in a CIT can reveal hidden guilty
knowledge.

3.3 Measuring Orienting and Defensive Behavior in Screening
Applications
Measures of the orienting and defensive reflexes traditionally target skin
conductance response (SCR), respiration, and heart rate (Gamer, et al., 2008).
Sensors for measuring these physiological reactions require direct contact and
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manual calibration and supervision—making application to security screening
infeasible. These considerations lead us to evaluate alternative measures for
detecting concealed knowledge. Though much recent CIT research has begun using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or similar brain imaging techniques
(e.g., Gamer, et al., 2007; Ganis, Rosenfeld, Meixner, Kievit, & Schendan, 2011; Hahm
et al., 2009; Langleben et al., 2002), the procedures and measurement apparatus for
these scenarios are even more invasive than traditional techniques, and likely would
require even more specialized supervision. Recent research in deception detection
has indicated that eye movement can betray deception (Douglas C. Derrick, Moffitt,
& Nunamaker, 2011; Osher, 2007; Steptoe, Steed, Rovira, & Rae, 2010; Twyman, et
al., 2010), and advances in eye tracking technology are such that eye movement can
be measured non-invasively at a distance. Body movement rigidity and response
time have likewise shown potential as cues to deception. For this study I chose eyemovement tracking, movement tracking, and response time as non-contact,
automated alternatives for measuring the orienting reflex and the defensive
response to aversive stimuli.

3.3.1 Oculomotor Orienting Behavior
When a presented novel or significant stimulus demands visual processing,
the eyes reflexively orient toward the stimulus. The rapid movement of the eye from
one point of visual focus to another is termed a saccade. Saccades are the most
common type of eye movement, and can be reflexive (such as when driven by the
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orienting reflex), or they can be overt (such as when performing a visual search
task) (Hollingworth, 2007; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989).
Eye-movement patterns have long been used in cognitive psychology
research to explore both the orienting reflex and overt attention shifts
(Hollingworth, 2007; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner, 1980), and some IS research
has similarly begun to use eye-movement behavior as a surrogate for visual
attention (Cyr, Head, Larios, & Pan, 2009; Djamasbi, Siegel, Skorinko, & Tullis, 2011;
Lorigo et al., 2008). The popular spotlight theory of attention (Posner, 1980) posits
that stimuli outside the focus of attention are processed by peripheral attention.
Visual stimuli are first discovered by peripheral attention; if a stimulus has a
sufficient level of significance or novelty the eyes will move toward it. Importantly,
saccades can be either reflexive or overt (i.e., consciously controlled) (Duchowski,
2007). To the extent saccades are reflexive they will occur before the stimulus is
consciously identified (Posner, 1980).
I propose a system design that exploits this reflexive visual orienting. To do
this I propose using visual rather than auditory CIT foils, and presenting foil items
simultaneously rather than in a sequence. If visual foils are displayed
simultaneously on a screen, those who are hiding knowledge about a particular
event should be more likely to orient their initial attention reflexively, and therefore
their eyes, toward the visual CIT item that is associated with their guilty knowledge.
For instance, if a visual CIT foil consists of the words “bombs,” “knives,” “guns,” and
“ammunition,” a person hiding an explosive device should reflexively saccade
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toward the word “bombs,” as it currently should have the highest level of personal
significance relative to the alternative items. In contrast, a person without guilty
knowledge would be significantly less likely to orient toward the word, “bombs.” I
thus hypothesize that
H1. Guilty knowledge increases the likelihood that an initial saccade will be
directed toward the critical item in a collection of simultaneously presented CIT
foil items.

As noted, orienting theory posits that over time, the orienting reflex
diminishes in a manner corresponding to the associated decrease in novelty and/or
personal significance. As an individual gains experience with the format of a rapid
screening CIT, he or she could find the novelty of the stimuli diminish. Accordingly, I
hypothesize that
H2. Over time, stimuli representing guilty knowledge will be less likely to attract
the initial saccade.

3.3.2 Response Time
An alternative measure that has been investigated in CIT literature is
response time. The orienting reflex may increase reaction time when an individual
is presented with relevant stimuli (Gamer, et al., 2007), because the reorienting of
cognitive resources (a result of the orienting reflex) causes a delay. Gronau and
colleagues found that response time was not significantly discriminatory measure
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when answering Stroop-like questions regarding a mock crime (Gronau, BenShakhar, & Cohen, 2005). However, other studies successfully used reaction time in
modified CITs (Seymour & Fraynt, 2009; Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann,
2000), and one suggests it may produce discriminating power similar to the
polygraph (Verschuere, et al., 2004). Meanwhile, the counterargument for using
response time to discriminate concealed knowledge is that it may be easily
consciously controlled (Gronau, et al., 2005).
The benefit of response time in this context is that it can be measured noninvasively and automatically. In a rapid screening context, response time may be a
useful measure. I replicate the hypothesis of prior CIT work here:
H3: Guilty Knowledge will increase response latency when a critical item is
presented.

3.3.3 Oculomotor Defensive Behavior
I propose that upon initial detection of the critical foil item, persons with
guilty knowledge will exhibit defensive behavior. Upon detection of the threatening
item, attention should orient to the perception of a threat, triggering the defensive
response. While there are several possible defensive actions that could be taken,
defensive response theory holds that the default defensive response to a threat is
usually avoidance or escape (Gray, 1988). In the visual CIT design (detailed in the
Methods section), a “safety” point is presented in the center of the screen when each
question is recited audibly. Its position is equidistant from all visual foil items,
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thereby serving as the optimal point of avoidance or point of greatest safety—away
from potential threats.
I thus propose that examinees with hidden guilty knowledge will focus more
visual attention on the best point of escape—the center point of the screen. Those
without guilty knowledge will manifest significantly less propensity to orient to this
center point, because they will not share this inherent need for “safety.” I thus
hypothesize that
H4. Guilty knowledge increases time spent gazing at the safety point.

Unlike the orienting reflex that diminishes with time, defensive behavior
should remain constant as long as the examinee has reason to perceive a threat.
Namely, a credible threat yesterday does not diminish another credible threat today.
This is an important consideration for contexts such as security screening where
testing may occur several times for frequent travelers. I thus hypothesize that
H5. Guilty knowledge increases critical stimuli avoidance during repeat
exposures.

3.3.4 Kinesic Defensive Behavior
Standard interviewing techniques such as the CIT use multiple sensors to help
decrease the potential for error and the possibility of capitalizing on chance. It is
likewise prudent in an automated human screening scenario to investigate multiple
indicators of concealed knowledge. Though absent from CIT research, much
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research in deception detection has investigated kinesic (body movement)
correlates of veracity. Kinesic rigidity has been documented under conditions of low
veracity. Specifically, during high-stakes deception a liar tends to exhibit fewer
random movements, such as fewer instances of rubbing hands together or bouncing
a leg. Expressive or illustrative movements that do occur tend to be more confined
and seem forced, as if they are being resisted (Buller & Aune, 1987; Vrij, 1995; Vrij,
et al., 1996).
There are at least two theories that have been used to explain the rigidity
phenomenon: cognitive load theory and behavioral control theory. The next
subsections review these theories and explore how they relate to the defensive
response. Though the rigidity phenomenon has been explored in other research, it
has never been explored within the context of the CIT, or an automated screening
approach. Thus, this section explores the potential viability of rigidity as a cue to
concealed knowledge within a CIT framework, and proposes a method for the
automatic detection of rigidity in a CIT context.

3.3.4.1 Cognitive Load Theory
Cognitive load theory proposes that lying takes more cognitive effort than
telling the truth, and assumes that fabricating events requires more cognitive
resources than simply recalling events (Vrij et al., 2008). Because more cognitive
resources are allocated to creating a plausible deception, other activities, including
movement, are given less attention. Because of the decrease in cognitive resources
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allocated to body movement, fewer illustrative or communicative gestures are
expected as a result.

3.3.4.2 Behavioral Control Theory
People have motivation to hide personal knowledge related to information
that if revealed, would lead to adverse consequences. When attention orients
toward stimuli that represent information associated with guilty knowledge, the
individual initiates purposeful behaviors designed to avoid potential negative
outcomes. Consciously controlling actions in order to appear truthful is a
phenomenon that has been termed behavioral control in the deception detection
literature. When behavioral control can be detected, it can be an indicator of
deception (DePaulo, et al., 1988).
Postural rigidity during low-veracity communications is a type of behavioral
control. Veracity assessment research has shown that the general population holds
to a false believe that liars show increased nervousness in their body movements.
Interestingly, while the average person believes a person shows increased body
movement when lying, the opposite tends to be the case. A deceiver may therefore
overtly become more rigid in an attempt to mimic their own false perception of
what a truthful communication should look like.
However, one study found that rigidity seems to persist even when the liar is
aware that such behavior is suspicious (Vrij, et al., 1996), suggesting that rigidity
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may not be an exclusively overt behavior, and it may be difficult to consciously
counter this effect.

3.3.4.3 Cognitive Load and Behavioral Control as Defensive Responses
Both of these theories describe defensive responding. The underlying driver
of the defensive response is the perception of a threat. When a threat is detected, the
sympathetic nervous system activates, moving the body to a state of hypervigilance.
The initial stage of the defensive response has been called the “stop, look, and listen”
reflex (Bracha, Ralston, Matsukawa, Williams, & Bracha, 2004; Gray, 1988). This
phenomenon creates cognitive arousal above what is normal.
Thus, from the beginning of the threat perception, cognitive load becomes a
factor. The increase cognitive arousal continues at least as long as the threat is
present, and those resources are used to combat the threat. One method of
combating the threat may be overt behavioral control of movement, or a focus on
verbal messaging that decreases resources allocated to non-verbal messaging. In
either case, increased cognitive arousal stemming from defensive nervous system
activation is the initial driver of the modified behavior.
There is another, more autonomic feature of the defensive response. A
“freeze” response is one method of combating a threat, though it is usually
characterized as a last-resort defensive tactic. When no other option for fighting or
escaping is apparent, individuals instinctively “freeze up,” purportedly in an effort to
avoid drawing attention from the threat in hopes it will take little notice.
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Whether cognitive load, behavioral control, or freeze response, the
hypothesized result is a decrease in overall body movement. This study does not
directly compare these theories, but it is the author’s opinion that each of them may
contribute the rigidity phenomenon to varying degrees under different contexts.

3.3.4.4 Rigidity in the CIT
To date, no known study has investigated rigidity in a CIT. At first glance,
analyzing body movement in a CIT seems almost a non-sequitur. The examinee
gives only a “yes” or “no” answer to each foil item, or repeats a word spoken by the
interviewer, then sits in silence for several seconds. No communicative body
movement is required during the interaction. Because the CIT requires no message
fabrication, very few cognitive resources will be allocated to creating a believable
verbal message. Likewise, illustrative movement will not be present, and therefore
cannot be actively manipulated by the examinee in an attempt to appear truthful.
This is not to say cognitive activation will be absent. To the contrary, the
presentation of a threatening stimulus such as will occur when the correct foil
option is presented will activate the defensive response, which increases cognitive
activation autonomically.
In spite of the lack of communicative movement, rigidity should still be
present during the presentation of relevant CIT foil items. First, rigidity should
occur as a result of the freeze response. Secondly, the simple one-word answer
should require few cognitive resources, leaving ample resources to allocate toward
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attempting to avoid detection by controlling body language. Both of these
mechanisms may involve an unconscious or semi-conscious reaction, which may
help to explain the findings of Vrij and colleagues (1996), who discovered that
individuals have difficulty countering this tendency toward rigidity.
H6: Guilty knowledge will increase body movement rigidity while a critical item
is presented.
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4.

A NOVEL METHOD FOR MEASURING RIGIDITY

Traditionally, rigidity has been measured using human coders, who
subjectively rate the appearance of forced versus natural gesturing given the type of
gesture and the context in which it was made. Human coding is limited to the gross
movement that can be perceived by a given coder and it remains subject to intercoder error. Minute changes in movement can be imperceptible to human coders.
The largest limitation of subjective rigidity coding is the large amount of time and
labor cost required.
As an alternative to subjective human rigidity coding, I developed a novel
automated method for measuring rigidity that is well suited for a CIT-based human
screening system. Automated rigidity measurement via computer vision can
introduce potential for more objective, real-time results at a much lower cost than
human coding, allowing for more widespread application. Such an advance is critical
if rigidity is to be included in an automated human screening system. The method
involves using computer vision techniques (e.g., Kanaujia, Huang, & Metaxas, 2006;
Meservy, Jensen, Kruse, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2005) to identify face and hands in
video and use frame-by-frame position changes of these features to calculate overall
body movement during CIT segments.
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4.1 Skin Blob Tracking
To measure hand/arm movement automatically, I adopted a video analysis
approach. For this study, I employ a skin blob tracking technique initially introduced
to deception detection research by Meservy and colleagues (Meservy, Jensen, Kruse,
Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2005). To measure head movement, I employ an Active
Shape Modeling technique (Kanaujia, et al., 2006). These techniques analyze video
frame by frame. For each frame, the face is detected using the Viola-Jones algorithm
(Viola & Jones, 2004). Once the face is detected, hand/arm “blobs” are identified by
searching for areas of similar skin color. The centroid of each hand/arm blob is
among the features identified in each frame.
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Figure 3. Depiction of skin blob tracking for face and hands. The face is
detected and face skin color is used as a reference to detect hands.

4.2 Active Shape Modeling for Tracking Head Movement
Compared to hand/arm movement, minor changes in head movement may be
more difficult to detect in standard-definition video. An alternative procedure for
measuring head movement is to analyze a close-up video recording of the face. For
this study I used a software suite patented by Rutgers University called ASM Face
Tracker (Kanaujia, et al., 2006). The software suite tracks the 2-dimensional
position of many points on a face in a close-up video feed in standard definition. The
computer vision technique is built on an active shape model (ASM), which uses
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statistical models of face shapes to match identified points on an object in one image
to points on an object in a new image. In essence, the ASM algorithm tries to match
the statistical model parameters to the image. Thus the model can deform (e.g.,
stretch), but not beyond what would be naturally seen in a real-world object, given
properly defined model parameters (Cootes, Taylor, Cooper, & Graham, 1995). For
faces, this means that identified facial points must as a whole represent the image of
a face. For instance, a point on the chin cannot be accidentally identified as
immediately adjacent to a point on the eye (Judee K. Burgoon et al., 2010).

4.3 Automating Rigidity Measurement
To measure movement in an interview, the centroids of the head and the left
and right hand blobs can be determined for each frame between the end of the
interviewer utterance and the beginning of the next interviewer utterance. Each
time the centroid of the skin blob changes positions, the total Euclidean distance
between pre- and post-change is calculated. The sum of these distances results in a
total distance moved for a given segment. This calculation is reflected in the
following model:
Ms

(y2-y1)2+(x2-x1)2)

The same model can be used to measure movement via the close-up video
analysis of the head. A point or set of points can be used in the same manner as the
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centroids from the skin blob input. Using the output from the ASM Face Tracker
software, a point near the center of the head was chosen for this study.
This measure of total distance moved could then be standardized in a withinsubject, within-question manner. This is an important step to account for the fact
that some people naturally move more than others, and the idea that variations in
discussion topic can have a greater or lesser impact on the orienting reflex and
defensive responding. In this study, total movement numbers are standardized
using within-subject, within-question z-scores.

4.4 Potential Limitations of Automated Rigidity Measurement
This method of automated rigidity measurement is well suited for the CIT. A
less controlled interviewing format introduces the possibility of one response
naturally requiring different body language than another. For instance, smaller
gestures may be used to communicate the concept of “little” in response to one
question, while larger gestures may be used to communicate “big” in response to a
separate question. Thus, simply comparing aggregated movement in an open-format
interview without considering response context would not lead to optimal
measurement of rigidity.
Efforts to automatically identify and classify body movements are ongoing,
but are currently inadequate for open-format discussions. The CIT’s controlled
format eliminates this problem because no communicative body movement is
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required during the interaction. In fact, the lack of communicative movement allows
for automated, more precise measurement of rigidity—by aggregating all movement
within each foil segment, the amount of movement during the critical foil item can
be compared to the amount of movement during the non-critical items, providing a
person-specific and question-specific baseline.
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5.

METHODS

I used two complementary methods to further this research, namely,
laboratory experimentation and system building. First, a traditional CIT was
conducted during an experiment that involved a mock crime. Next, I created a
prototype of an automated security screening system to test the modified CIT
process for rapid security screening. Finally, I conducted a laboratory experiment to
test the hypotheses and the efficacy of the design. The second experiment involved
having participants construct a mock improvised explosive device (IED) and then
attempt to bring it through a screening station.

5.1 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was part of a larger study led by Burgoon and colleagues for the
purpose of investigating noninvasive, multimodal measurement in deception
detection (J. Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Metaxas, 2010). The experiment involved the
commission of a mock crime. Participants were divided into two conditions, termed
“Guilty” and “Innocent.” Participants in both conditions were given elaborate
instructions on activities to accomplish as part of their participation. Activities for
participants in the Guilty condition mirrored those in the Innocent condition, except
that those in the Guilty condition also stole a ring out of a desk. After the activities
were completed, all participants were interviewed by a professional polygraph
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examiner. Near the end of this interview, examinees underwent a CIT. Video
recordings of these CIT portions of interviews were submitted to computer vision
algorithms to generate body movement data for this study.

5.1.1 Experiment 1 Participants
Participants (N=164) were recruited from the local community, via
advertisements in local and school newspapers, community shoppers, and craigslist.
About three quarters of the sample (76%) were Caucasian, 9% were of Hispanic
descent, 7% African-American, with the remainder including Asian, Native
American, or other ethnic background. Few (8%) were students, though 40%
reported some college and 26% reported a four-year degree. 20% reported only a
high school education. Of the 164 enrolled participants, 134 (82%) followed
instructions and completed the task. The remaining 18% were disqualified because
they either did not follow instructions or confessed during the interview portion of
the task. The average age of each participant was 39.5 (standard deviation of 14.0).
5.1.2 Experiment 1 Task
Participants in the experiment were instructed to arrive at a room in an
upper floor of an old apartment complex. A pre-recorded set of instructions was
waiting for them. After listening to the recorded instructions and signing a consent
form, participants left the apartment complex and walked to the nearby school.
Per instructions, participants reported to a room on the top floor and asked
for a Mr. Carlson. A confederate acting as a new receptionist who did not know Mr.
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Carlson asked the participant to wait while he went to locate Mr. Carlson. A hidden
webcam in the room verified the participants’ activities while they were waiting for
the receptionist’s return. Participants in the innocent condition simply waited, while
those in the guilty condition had been instructed to steal a diamond ring from the
desk. Those in the guilty condition took a key from a mug on the top of a desk and
used it to open a blue cash box in the desk drawer that was hidden underneath a
tissue box. They removed the ring from the cash box and hid it somewhere on their
person.
After his return, the confederate receptionist directed each participant to
another room on the bottom floor. Upon arrival, each participant was told that a
crime had occurred in the building that day and that they would be interviewed to
assess their possible involvement in that crime. Each participant was then
interviewed by one of four professional interviewers provided from several
intelligence agencies with the assistance of the National Center for Credibility
Assessment (NCCA). The interviewers were trained and experienced in criminal
interviewing, and were familiar with the purpose and procedure involved in
administering a Concealed Information Test.
A CIT test consisting of three CIT foils took place near the end of the
interview. Measurements taken during these three questions were included in the
analyses. The three questions together with their associated relevant and irrelevant
items are included in the table below.
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Table 2. CIT Foils used in Experiment 1
Foil
Number
1

Question
“If you are the person who stole
the ring, you are familiar with
details of the cash box it was
stored in. Repeat after me these
cash box colors:”

2

“If you are the person who stole
the ring, you moved an object in
the desk drawer to locate the cash
box containing the ring. Repeat
after me these objects:”

3

“If you are the person who stole
the ring, you know what type of
ring it was. Repeat after me these
types of rings:”

Words Repeated by
Suspect
1. Green
2. Beige
3. White
4. Blue*
5. Black
6. Red
1. Notepad
2. Telephone book
3. Woman’s sweater
4. Laptop bag
5. Tissue box*
6. Brown purse
1. Emerald ring
2. Turquoise ring
3. Amethyst ring
4. Diamond ring*
5. Ruby ring
6. Gold ring

Note: Relevant items denoted by *.

Many CIT studies have participants review relevant items prior to the
interview or testing phase to ensure salience. While this practice may provide some
experimental control, it is not a reasonable procedure for real-world applications.
Since a goal of this study is to investigate potential for real-world application, no
review of relevant items was used. To ensure high validity in field settings, a CIT
needs to contain questions such that relevant items have a very high probability of
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being personally significant to the real criminal (e.g., a murder weapon or an
unexpected event that happened during the crime).
At the end of the interview, participants were paid for their time and were
given an additional $50 monetary reward if they successfully convinced the
interviewer that they were innocent. This large monetary reward together with the
realism of the experiment was important to induce motivation to succeed. At the
end of the interview, the interviewer made a judgment as to the participant’s guilt or
innocence. Manipulation checks ensured that the participants conducted their task
per their condition. A final questionnaire contained these simple manipulation
check questions, together with a question about perceived behavioral control, and
measures of arousal and motivation levels.

5.1.3 Experiment 1 Equipment
During the interview, several cameras and other measurement equipment
were present in the room, though no equipment was actually attached or touched
the participant, as the goal was to assess deception or guilt non-invasively. Two
video cameras were placed directly in front of the chair each participant sat in
during the interview. One camera captured a full-body frame, while the second
camera concentrated on a close-up of the head. The chair had no armrests and a low
back. No other furniture or objects were placed within reaching distance. All of this
was done to ensure a clear camera view. It also ensured arms and hands could only
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rest on legs during the CIT portion of the interview. In this way, hand/arm
movement also reflects leg movement.

5.2 The Automated Screening Kiosk System
An automated screening kiosk (ASK) system was designed as a means of
implementing the design for a rapid screening CIT. I constructed the ASK to test the
hypotheses and to discover the technical challenges, limitations, and unexpected
findings from building such a system.
The ASK system was designed to conduct a rapid visual CIT automatically
while simultaneously gathering oculometric, kinesic (i.e., body movement), and
vocalic data. Though the ASK does not currently provide veracity judgments in realtime, future versions of ASK will include real-time judgment capability. The ASK
gathers eye movement data using an EyeTech™ TM3 eye tracking device. The ASK
gathers kinesic and vocalic data using high-definition video recording and a studioquality microphone. The kinesic and vocalic data will be analyzed as part of a future
study.
The ASK system waits in a readiness state until it recognizes eyes within the
field of recognition of the TM3. Once it recognizes eyes, the process begins
automatically. A computer-generated voice gives initial instructions to the person
being screened. ASK then guides the individual through a 10- to 15-second 9-point
calibration process, which allows the device to more accurately track each
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individual’s unique oculomotor activity. Figure 4 depicts the EyeTech TM3 eyetracking device.

Figure 4. The EyeTech TM3 eye-tracking device. The TM3 is optimally placed
directly below a computer monitor.

Following a successful calibration, ASK uses a computer-generated voice to
ask CIT-based questions. While a CIT question is asked, the screen remains blank
except for a fixation marker in the center of the screen. This fixation marker serves
to standardize the starting point for visual attention prior to the presentation of a
foil. It also serves as the single point on the screen that is equidistant from all foil
items (the “safest” place). Figure 5 depicts this fixation marker.

59

Figure 5. Fixation marker present when each foil question was asked.

Immediately following each question, the fixation marker disappears as ASK
simultaneously presents four boxes on the screen, equidistant from one another—
one in each quadrant of the screen. These “stimuli screens” are displayed for 7.5
seconds each, allowing time for the participant to examine each of the four stimuli
and respond to the question verbally with a “Yes” or “No.”
The entire process takes approximately two minutes. After completing the
process, the ASK instructs the participant to proceed forward, then returns to a
readiness state, awaiting the next participant. These features allow the system to
operate automatically, without requirement of human intervention, except in cases
where the ASK determines that further screening is desirable. In such
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circumstances, an ASK could be designed to alert a managing human agent, while
simultaneously directing the traveler to a secondary screening station.

5.3 Experiment 2
The experimental design involved two treatments with eight repeated
measures presented on two separate days (4 per day). The two treatments were
termed Guilty and Innocent. Half of participants were assigned to the Guilty
treatment, which involved constructing a mock IED (i.e., bomb) and packing it in a
bag. Innocent participants also packed a bag. Both conditions involved bringing the
packed bag through a mock building security screening station. The purpose of
constructing an IED was to simulate guilty knowledge as closely as possible in a
laboratory environment. If there is no arousal associated with the concealed
knowledge, defensive responding is unlikely to occur.
Participants interacted with the screening system twice, with the second
interaction occurring on the day immediately following the initial interaction. The
repeated measures occurred at the screening station, where participants viewed
four visual CIT foils, with oculomotor measurements recorded during the
presentation of each foil.
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5.3.1 Experiment 2 Participants
Participants (N=172) were recruited from an introductory MIS course at a
large southwestern university in the United States. This course includes students
from across the university. Students participated to fulfill a course requirement to
participate in a research experiment. Participants’ average age was 23; 61.7% were
of Caucasian descent; 13.1% were from Asian or Pacific Islander descent; 17.1%
were of Hispanic descent; and 6.3% were of multi-racial descent. Participant gender
was evenly split: 50% percent were female and 50% were male.
All human-subjects protocols were followed, and the experimental design
was approved by the institution’s human subjects review board. Each participant
was aware that their participation was strictly voluntary, and each was instructed
that he or she could refuse to participate or halt participation at any time, and
alternative means of fulfilling the course requirement were available. A review of
anonymized, open-ended feedback collected at the end of the experiment revealed
that although most participants in the guilty condition found the experience
somewhat unnerving, they appreciated the stated goals of the experiment and
hoped their participation would help improve security screening technology.

5.3.2 Experiment 2 Task
The task I chose for the experiment focused on security screening for
explosives because this is a real-world high-stakes scenario of interest where guilty
knowledge is highly salient. Again, the two between-subjects experimental
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conditions were Innocent and Guilty. After completing a short questionnaire,
participants received written instructions telling them to pack a bag and deliver it to
an office in a secure portion of the building. To enter the secure portion of the
building, the participant needed to pass through a security screening process.
Participants packed the bag with items provided (e.g. clothes, pad of paper, book,
and other innocuous items). The instructions briefly mentioned that if judged
suspicious, a secondary screening process would be necessary, which in the case of
innocent participants would take additional time, thereby preventing them from
delivering the bag in a timely manner. Guilty participants were reminded that a
more in-depth screening would expose their deception and prevent their delivering
a bag.
Participants in the Guilty condition had two additional instructions. First,
they received instructions on how to construct a mock explosive device (preassembled parts were provided) and were told to pack it in their bag along with the
other items. Figure 6 is a photograph of an actual device used in the experiment.
Second, they were shown a photograph of the face of a person to which they were to
deliver the bag. After packing the bag, each participants came to the screening room
where they interacted with the ASK.
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Figure 6. Improvised explosive device (IED) constructed by half
of participants.

For this experiment, the ASK conducted five CIT-based questions. The first
four CIT questions read as follows:
The following items are not allowed beyond this point. Are you carrying any of
these items?

Of the four boxes containing foil items that were subsequently presented,
only one contained a word that was designed to relate to guilty knowledge (i.e.,
“Bombs,” “Explosives”, “Weapons”), though all boxes contained a word describing a
name of a banned class of items. These words were pretested via self-report to
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ensure they were equally arousing by default. Figure 7 illustrates the screen shown
to the participants. The other items were certain to not be carried by participants,
since what was packed in their bags was known beforehand1.

Figure 7. Example of a simultaneous visual foil presented by ASK.

The visual location of the item associated with guilty knowledge was rotated
in a balanced fashion. The presentation order of visual foils was similarly rotated.
As an exploratory measure, an additional CIT question presented by the ASK
computerized voice read as follows:
1

In a field environment, control items for the CIT would need to be carefully chosen such that they are certain to not be
present. For instance, “rifle” could be an effective control foil item in many security screening field environments:
screeners can be certain no rifles are present because they cannot be effectively hidden on one’s person and would be
easily detected by a luggage scanner.
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The following people are wanted by local authorities. Are you familiar with any of
these people?

Similar in format to the first four CIT questions, the ASK displayed four
images on the screen immediately following the question (see Figure 8). For
participants in the guilty condition, one of the faces evoked knowledge that the
participant would desire to conceal: one image represented the same person to
whom they were directed to deliver the IED in the instructions that preceded the
screening process. Minear and Park (2004) approved and supplied specially
designed face images for this experiment. To encourage a sense of realism, I chose to
use images of faces that are most likely to remind participants of a stereotypical
individual who might be involved in terrorist activity. I also chose faces that were
fairly similar in features, to ensure an inordinate amount of attention would not be
drawn to a particular face simply because it possessed features that stood out where
others did not. This final visual CIT foil was added as an exploratory item; the
analysis of this portion of the screening can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 8. Faces CIT foil. This was presented at the end of each
screening, immediately after the question: "Are you familiar
with any of these people?"

Participants were asked not to disclose details of the experiment to anyone
until a date when data collection would be completed. Each participant was also
asked whether he or she had heard any details about the experiment prior to
participating, and were promised that full credit would be given regardless of their
answer to this question.

5.3.3 Experiment 2 Measures
The EyeTech eye tracking system exported raw data in Cartesian coordinate
format. The following measurements were derived for each participant and visual
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foil: the initial direction of the first saccade after each question (dummy coded as 1
if toward critical foil item), and the percentage of time spent gazing at the safety
point during the time provided for a response.
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6.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The datasets for experiments 1 and 2 were analyzed separately. First
reported are the analyses for experiment 1 investigating rigidity. For experiment 2,
two analyses were performed. The first used eye movement data and the second
involved response time.

6.1 Experiment 1 (Rigidity Detection) Analysis and Results
As part of the post-interview questionnaire, respondents self-reported their
level of motivation and arousal on 7-point scales. Respondents also answered two
questions regarding non-verbal behavioral control. The items used to measure these
are shown in the table below.

Table 3. Reliabilities and Means for Self-Reported Motivation, Arousal, and
Non-Verbal Behavioral Control
Measure
Items
Reliability Mean
(S.D.)
1. During the interview, how important was Cronbach’s 6.03
it to you to succeed in making the
α = .90
(.14)
interviewer believe you?
2. During the interview, how important was
Motivation
it to you to give convincing answers?
3. How hard did you try to convince the
interviewer that you were telling the truth?
How did you feel during the interview:
Cronbach’s 3.11
…Nervous (1-7)
α = .89
(.61)
…Flustered (1-7)
Arousal
…Tense (1-7)
…Relaxed (1-7) (reverse-coded)
…Uneasy (1-7)
…Stressed (1-7)
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Non-Verbal
Behavioral
Control:
Effectiveness
Non-Verbal
Behavioral
Control:
Effort

How effective were you in controlling your
nonverbal behavior during the interview?

n/a

4.53
(1.65)

How much did you try to control your
nonverbal behavior (gestures, posture, etc.)
during the interview?

n/a

3.99
(1.98)

The difference in perceived effectiveness of controlling non-verbal behavior
was not statistically different between the two conditions. Self-reported arousal and
motivation levels likewise were not statistically different between groups. For the
question regarding effort allocated to non-verbal control, participants in the guilty
condition reported significantly (F= 7.39(1,133), η2 = .053; p = .007) more effort
(M=4.59, s.d. = 1.79) than their counterparts (M = 3.65, SD = 2.01).
The video recordings of each interview were analyzed using the computer
vision techniques outlined in an earlier section. Because of technical problems with
the video recording and analysis system, only 107 of the initial 134 cases produced
usable data for analysis. Of these 107 participants, 64 were female. In this subset, 40
participants “committed” the crime, leaving 67 who did not.
A multilevel regression model was specified for overall movement during
each foil item. The summation of standardized movement scores for right hand, left
hand, and head movement was used as the dependent variable. Multilevel
regression models use adjusted standard errors to reflect the uncertainty that arises
from variation within subject. The independent variables included Condition
(dummy coded: 1 = Guilty, 0 = Innocent), Participant, Foil Item Type (dummy coded:
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1 = Critical Item, 0 = Neutral Item). Question, and Interviewer were initially included
as covariates but were not significant predictors and were subsequently dropped
from the model. The effect of greatest interest is the Condition and Foil Item Type
interaction. The results of the multilevel regression model are shown below.

Table 4. Overall Movement: Multilevel Regression Model Results
β Standard
Fixed Effects
Error
β
Intercept
0.044 (n.s.)
0.069
Hidden Guilty Knowledge
0.102 (n.s.)
0.109
Foil Item Type
-0.197 (n.s.) 0.171
Hidden Guilty Knowledge :
-0.624*
0.267
Foil Item Type
Notes: N = 1887. Model fit using maximum likelihood.
* p < .05, (n.s.) not significant.

To test if the Condition and Item Type interaction provides a significant
improvement to the fit of the data, the model was compared to an unconditional
model, which omits any fixed effects, using deviance-based hypothesis tests. The fit
of the current model was significantly better than the unconditional model, χ2(1, N =
1887) = 17.15, p < .001.
Depictions of the overall movement patterns are shown in the next three
figures. Foil item 4 was the relevant (i.e. correct) item for CIT foils 1 and 3, and foil
item 5 was the relevant item for foil item 2.
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Figure 9. Movement During CIT Foil 1
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Figure 10. Movement During CIT Foil 2
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Figure 11. Movement During CIT Foil 3

An exploratory analysis was undertaken to identify whether rigidity was
evenly dispersed across the body, or whether it was concentrated in one or more
areas. Separate multilevel regression models were specified for the head, right hand,
and left hand movement. The results of these models are detailed below.
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Table 5. Overall Movement: Results of Separate Multilevel Regression Models

Fixed Effects

Right Hand
Movement

Left Hand
Movement

Head
Movement

β

β

β

(S. E.)
(S. E.)
Intercept
.004
.001
(.030)
(.030)
Foil Item Type
.010
-.006
(.073)
(.074)
Hidden Guilty Knowledge
.044
.022
(.047)
(.047)
Hidden Guilty Knowledge :
-.293*
-.125
Foil Item Type
(.116)
(.116)
Notes: N = 1887. Model fit using maximum likelihood.
* p < .05, ** p < .01.

(S. E.)
.038
(.030)
-.201**
(.073)
.040
(.047)
-.228*
(.115)

Each model was compared to an unconditional model. Compared to the
unconditional model, the fit for the right hand and head movement models was
significantly better: Head Movement χ2 (1, N = 1887) = 30.55, p = .000; Right Hand
Movement χ2 (1, N = 1887) = 9.87, p = .020; Left Hand Movement χ2 (1, N = 1887) =
2.16, p = .540.
The figures below illustrate the relationship between guilt and right hand
movement for CIT relevant vs. irrelevant items for two sample CIT foils. On average,
a guilty participant’s right hand moved less during relevant foil items than
irrelevant foil items. Innocent participants showed no difference in their right hand
movement. Head movement followed a trend similar to the right hand.
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Figure 12. Right hand movement during CIT Foil 2

Figure 13. Right hand movement during CIT Foil 3
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6.1.1 Comparison of Head Movement Measurement Techniques
Both the ASM and skin blob tracking computer vision techniques provide
usable data for measuring head movement. The ASM data was produced using video
of a close-up view of the head, while the skin blob tracking data was produced using
a full body frame. The ASM data was chosen for the above analyses because the
close-up view provided the ability to measure head movement at the more finegrained level. In other words, more head movement was visible in the close-up view
than in the full-body view. Both camera angles were recorded in standard definition.
Does the close-up view actually improve measurement? To test this
assumption, I compare the model of head movement based on the close-up video to
a model produced using the full body video. Both models are based on the same
participants and experiment, yet the model that employs facial close-up video
produced statistically significant results while the other did not. A comparison of the
two models is shown in the table below.
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Table 6. Comparison of head movement models

Fixed Effects

Head Movement
Head Movement
(using full-body video) (using close-up of face)
β

β

(S. E.)
(S. E.)
Intercept
.010
.038
(.030)
(.030)
Foil Item Type
-.065
-.201**
(.073)
(.073)
Hidden Guilty Knowledge
.011
.040
(.047)
(.047)
Hidden Guilty Knowledge : -.019
-.228*
Foil Item Type
(.116)
(.115)
Notes: N = 1887. Model fit using maximum likelihood.
* p < .05, ** p < .01.

6.1.2 Classification Accuracy of Rigidity in the CIT
To estimate how effective this pattern might be in a predictive application, I
performed a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis to assess the ability of
overall rigidity for predicting guilt. The ROC curve reflects the tradeoffs between a
true positive rate (sensitivity) and false positive rate (1 minus specificity) when
selecting a classification model. If, for example, all interviewees were classified as
guilty, guilt detection accuracy would be 100%, but all innocent parties would be
incorrectly classified as guilty as well, producing a 100% false positive rate. The
standardized movement scores for head and hands for critical items were included
as predictor variables. This produced an area under the curve (AUC) of .77, which
can be interpreted as 77% prediction accuracy. The underlying logistic prediction
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model produces a Nagelkerke R2 of .28 and a Cox & Snell R2 of .21. The ROC curve is
represented graphically in the figure below.

Figure 14. ROC Curve Estimating the Predictive Power of Rigidity in the CIT in
Experiment 1.

The 77% prediction accuracy is comparable to the 77% accuracy produced
by the professional polygraph examiners on the same subset of participants. These
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interviewers possessed extensive training and made judgments based on both the
CIT and an interrogation conducted prior to the CIT, whereas the automated kinesic
classification reported here used only CIT data.

6.2 Experiment 2 (ASK Oculomotor) Analysis
Of the 172 participants, 36 were disqualified either because they did not
follow instructions (23 cases), or because of system failures2 (13 cases). Data from
the remaining 136 participants were used in the analysis.
To assess whether the manipulation worked properly, manipulation check
questions were added to the post-survey to determine: (1) whether guilty
participants possessed concealed knowledge, and (2) whether the concealed
knowledge was perceived as aversive by participants. Experiment conductors had
visual confirmation that those in the guilty condition constructed and packed the
mock IED. However it was important to ensure that participants understood that
these actions were illicit, or there would be little reason for a defensive response.
The vast majority of participants (57 of 61 or 93%) in the guilty condition correctly
reported that they had carried an illicit item through security screening. On the
second day, 54 of 57 (95%) in the guilty condition correctly reported their attempt

2

Physical eye damage and a small percentage of glasses proved problematic. Additionally, the
narrowness of the range of allowed head movement caused some of the failures. Alternative eye-tracking
systems and modified calibration algorithms will be used to minimize these types of system failures in
future iterations of the ASK.
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to carry an illicit item through screening. Those participants who either confessed
or All participants in the innocent condition correctly reported on both days that
they did not carry an illicit item. For each stimulus word, all participants reported
how much attention that stimulus captured on a 7-point scale, to gauge their
perceived signal value. On day 1, participants in the guilty condition rated the signal
value of critical items higher than non-critical items (F = 107.9 (1, 120), η2 = .47, p <
0.001), while innocent participants reported no significant difference (F = 2.8(1,144),
η2 = .02, p = .095). Day 2 showed similar results, with guilty participants reporting
higher signal value on critical items (F = 37.7(1,112), η2 = .25, p < .001), and innocent
participants showing no such effect (F = 2.1(1,132), η2 = .02, p = .15). Table 2 displays
self-reported signal value statistics.

Table 7. Means and standard deviations of self-reported signal value of foil
items
Critical Foil
Items
Non-critical
Items

Day 1 Guilty
M=5.46,
SD=1.42
M=2.69,
SD=1.52

Day 2 Guilty
M=4.68,
SD=1.87
M=2.71,
SD=1.55

Day 1 Innocent
M=4.26,
SD=2.32
M=3.70,
SD=1.65

Day 2 Innocent
M=3.96,
SD=2.26
M=3.45,
SD=1.70

A multilevel regression model was specified (n = 1020) using mean time
gazing at the safety point (center of the screen) as the response variable. Participant
(n = 136) was treated as a random factor, while the experiment condition, foil type
(baseline or charged), and participation day were treated as fixed effects. Foil
question order and critical item position on the screen were included as covariates.
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When a visual foil was charged (i.e., contained a critical item), only participants in
the guilty condition spent significantly more time (4.5%) gazing at the safety point
(t (1013) = 3.06, p < .01). The strength of this effect significantly increased (another
3.5%) on day 2, again only among participants in the guilty condition (t (1013) = 2.70,
p < .01). Location of the critical item on the screen (which quadrant) was initially
included in the model but was not significant and was subsequently removed. Time
likewise showed no significant effect and was removed from the model. Foil
presentation order was significant. When the foil containing the word “bombs” was
the first charged visual foil presented, gaze effects were more pronounced than
when the critical item was “explosives” or “weapons.” Table 3 summarizes the
multilevel regression results.
Table 8. Oculomotor Threat Avoidance (Gazing at the Center of the Screen) as
Response Variable for the Word CIT Foils
β Standard
Fixed Effects
Error
β
***
Intercept
0.110
0.014
Hidden Guilty Knowledge
0.005 (n.s.)
0.019
Participation Day
0.000 (n.s.)
0.009
(n.s.)
Threatening Foil
0.016
0.010
Hidden Guilty Knowledge :
0.035**
0.013
Participation Day
Hidden Guilty Knowledge :
0.045**
0.015
Threatening Foil
Foil Presentation Order 2
-0.021*
0.010
Foil Presentation Order 3
-0.022*
0.011
Notes: model fit by maximum likelihood. *** p < .001;
** p < .01; * p < .05; (n.s.) not significant.
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To test model fit, the model was compared to an unconditional model which
omitted any fixed effects, using deviance-based hypothesis tests. The fit of the
current model was significantly better than the unconditional model, χ2(1, N =
1020) = 64.69, p < .001.
An overall logistic multilevel regression revealed no main effect of condition
on the direction of the initial saccade. However, a near-significant interaction effect
of condition and participation day was noted, z(765) = 1.79, p = .07. Separate analyses
for each day revealed that for participants with guilty knowledge, the initial saccade
was biased toward the critical item during the second day of screening, z(360) = 2.34,
Nagelkerke R2 = .14, p = .02, but not the first day, z(404) = -0.04, Nagelkerke R2 = .12, p
= .88. The model fit for the second day was significant compared to an unconditional
model, χ2(1, N = 360) = 8.41, p < .05.
The exploratory CIT question involving faces was analyzed separate from
words. Multilevel regression models for the faces question were specified similar to
those used for questions involving word stimuli. Hidden guilty knowledge was
associated with a 6% increase in the amount of time gazing at the center of the
screen, t (249) = 3.00, p < .01. There were no main or interaction effects of
participation day. There were no significant effects of condition on initial saccade
for the faces CIT foil.
The results indicate that guilty knowledge significantly affected both the
tendency to look toward the critical item in a foil and the tendency to avoid looking
at any foil stimuli after initial detection. The hypothesis that guilty knowledge
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causes visual attention to orient toward a critical item in a CIT foil (H1) is partially
supported, with significant results occurring in day 2 but not in day 1. The
hypothesis that the orienting reflex would diminish over time (H2) was not
supported. The hypothesis that defensive behavior would encourage visual
attentiveness toward the safety point (H4) was supported. Finally, the hypothesis
that the defensive behavior effect would remain over time was supported (H5).

6.2.1 Oculomotor Defensive Behavior Classification Accuracy
An accuracy analysis can help establish that the initial system has some
potential value. The problem of trying to detect concealed knowledge in security
screening can be conceptualized as a signal detection problem (Basuchoudhary &
Razzolini, 2006; Ben-Shakhar, Lieblich, & Kugelmas.S, 1970).
Since oculomotor defensive behavior showed the strongest results, a receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis was performed on those data for each day.
Condition was positioned as the response variable, with gaze patterns during word
visual foils positioned as the predictor variables. For day 1, the oculomotor defense
patterns produced an area under the curve (AUC) of .67; an AUC of .68 was
produced from day 2 data. Graphs representing the ROC curves are depicted below.
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Day 1

Day 2

Figure 15. ROC Curves for Day 1 and 2 Oculomotor Defensive Behavior

6.3 Experiment 2 (ASK Response Time) Analysis
Response times were calculated by manually coding and calculating the time
lapsed between the end of each question and the beginning of each response.
Because these response time analyses were performed as part of a separate
research project, some of the results summarized here are expected to also be
reported by Hsu (2012). However, here I include additional analyses and discussion.
A multilevel regression model was specified (n = 1020) using response time
as the dependent variable. Participant (n = 136) was treated as a random factor,
while the experiment condition, foil type (baseline or charged), and participation
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day were treated as fixed effects. Foil question order and critical item position on
the screen were included as covariates.
As reported in Table 9, there was an overall main effect of participation day
and foil charge. There was no main effect of condition, but there was a three-way
interaction effect among condition, foil charge, and participation day. There was also
a significant two-way interaction between foil charge and participation day. The
order of presentation likewise had a significant effect: response time decreased
slightly but significantly when the foil with the word “Bombs” was presented second
rather than first or last.
When a visual foil was charged (i.e., contained a critical item), all participants
regardless of condition exhibited significantly shorter response times. Response
times also decreased the second day of participation; however, this effect was
moderated by the presence of a threatening foil item and completely disappeared
for those in the guilty condition. In other words, on the second day of participation,
guilty participants took longer to respond when foils that contained threatening
items were presented (compared to those in the innocent condition).
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Table 9. Response Time Multilevel Regression Results
β Standard

Fixed Effects
Error
β
Intercept
3.230***
0.092
Hidden Guilty Knowledge
0.105 (n.s.)
0.127
Participation Day
-0.699***
0.089
***
Threatening Foil
-0.534
0.071
Hidden Guilty Knowledge :
-0.129 (n.s.) 0.132
Participation Day
Hidden Guilty Knowledge :
-0.140 (n.s.) 0.103
Threatening Foil
Participation Day :
0.378***
0.102
Threatening Foil
Hidden Guilty Knowledge :
0.398**
0.151
Threatening Foil :
Participation Day
Foil Presentation Order 2
-0.124*
0.052
Foil Presentation Order 3
-0.041(n.s.) 0.058
Notes: model fit by maximum likelihood. *** p < .001;
** p < .01; * p < .05; (n.s.) not significant.

The response time model fit was strong compared to an unconditional model,
χ2(1, N = 1020) = 228.62, p < .001.

6.3.1 Response Time and Combined Classification Accuracy
A ROC analysis was performed that again specified condition as the response
variable and used response times from the first 4 slides as predictor variables. For
day 1, the ROC analysis produced an AUC of .57; an AUC of .66 was produced from
day 2 data. Graphs representing the ROC curves are depicted below.

87

Day 1

Day 2

Figure 16. ROC Curves for Day 1 and 2 Response Time

A final ROC analysis was performed that combined both response time and
oculomotor defensive behavior. Time spent gazing at the center of the screen for the
first four questions were included with response times for the same questions as
predictor variables. For day 1, the ROC analysis produced an AUC of .70; an AUC of
.72 was produced from day 2 data. Graphs representing the ROC curves are depicted
below.
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Day 1

Day 2

Figure 17. ROC Curves for combined oculomotor defensive response and
response time.

Though the combined classification shows improvement over the response
time or oculomotor defensive response models independently, analysis of deviance
tests suggest that the improvements may not be significant for either Day 1 (χ2 (1, N
= 100) = 3.76, p = .44) or Day 2 (χ2 (1, N = 100) = 5.32, p = .26).
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7.

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to propose and investigate theory, protocol,
and system design for the automated discovery of hidden knowledge. I chose to
center the ASK system design on the CIT screening protocol because of its
automation and interaction simplicity, and because it is considered to have the
highest validity in previous research. I applied both orienting and defensive
response theories to this novel area of research. This study proposed a method for
using computer vision techniques to assess rigidity, and for the first time rigidity
and oculomotor variables were investigated as potential cues to deception in a CIT.
The table below provides a summary of the hypotheses in this study.

Table 10. Summary of Hypotheses Support
Hypothesis
H1. Guilty knowledge increases the likelihood that an initial saccade will
be directed toward the critical item in a collection of simultaneously
presented CIT foil items.
H2. Over time, stimuli representing guilty knowledge will be less likely to
attract the initial saccade.
H3: Guilty Knowledge will increase response latency when a critical item
is presented.
H4. Guilty knowledge increases time spent gazing at the safety point.
H5. Guilty knowledge increases critical stimuli avoidance during repeat
exposures.
H6: Guilty knowledge will increase body movement rigidity while a
critical item is presented.

Supported?
Partially
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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The results provide support for the potential for automated rigidity detection
and oculomotor defensive behavior as alternative measurements in an ASK-like
human screening system design. Because of the relative novelty of this line of
research, there are many caveats, lessons learned, and areas for future research to
consider. The results will first be discussed separately and then in combination.

7.1 Experiment 1 Discussion
The purposes of experiment 1 were two-fold: the first was to implement
automated rigidity detection and glean insights from its use. The second was to
provide empirical evidence of the rigidity effect during a CIT. These two factors
inform the broader goal of investigating the potential of the proposed system design
for automated human screening for concealed knowledge.

7.1.1 Experiment 1 Summary of Results
Several insights were gleaned from implementing the automated rigidity
detection system. First, in spite of very little movement being present throughout
the CIT, the system was able to detect movement variations that discriminated
innocent from guilty participants in a realistic scenario. Second, greater ability to
detect movement (i.e., through higher-resolution video), appears to strengthen the
results.
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The empirical evaluation of rigidity in a CIT produced very interesting
results. An overall significant decrease in movement was found among those who
had stolen a ring when an interviewer presented the CIT critical item as compared
to when a non-critical item was presented. This significant decrease was present
across all three CIT foils. When total movement was broken down into head, right
hand, and left hand movement, head and right hand movement proved significant
while left hand movement did not, though it trended in the same direction.

7.1.2 Experiment 1 Key Contributions
The first key contribution of experiment 1 is evidence that supports the
proposition that rigidity is an active phenomenon in a CIT. Past research has
identified rigidity in less controlled interviewing environments, but contextual
variables such as question type effects may complicate or confound results. The CIT,
however, provides a simple, standardized, reproducible method that is free of
question type effects. This standardization and control provide a high level of
internal and external validity which benefits both research and practice.
In the experiment 1 CIT, interviewees did not explicitly lie. But although no
verbal deception occurred, the results showed that interviewees with guilty
knowledge exhibited defensive responding in the form of rigidity. While prior
research has confirmed that rigidity is associated with deception, most of these
studies have focused on active deception that involves communicative gesturing.
Kinesic cues to deception in the CIT have been largely ignored, presumably because
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of the lack of major movement. However, by applying defensive response theory,
this study provides evidence for the potential of kinesic cues in a CIT context.
Specifically, whenever a threat is perceived among alternative benign stimuli,
rigidity in the CIT should increase.
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Though rigidity appears to stem from defensive responding, this research
stopped short of discovering the precise type of response(s) that caused the rigidity.
However, one theoretical contribution of this work is to show that rigidity occurs
even when very little fabrication is required. Some prior research has suggested that
a higher demand on cognitive resources for fabrication may be a cause of rigidity, as
there should be fewer cognitive resources available to allocate toward non-verbal
messaging. But the results of this study indicate that rigidity can occur even when
demands for fabrication are minimal.
A second major contribution of this study was the introduction of automatic
detection of rigidity. Where in the past, the high cost of manual rigidity assessment
in standardized interviewing has limited its use to interested researchers, this study
shows that an automated, near-real time system for measuring and reporting
rigidity is feasible. A post-hoc, qualitative viewing of a sample of the interviews from
experiment 1 indicated that human coding of rigidity during a CIT may be very
difficult, because for most cases, human observers seem to find it difficult to
distinguish the relative amount of movement among foil items. This idea is further
bolstered by the fact that higher resolution video of the interviewee’s head was
required to discover the rigidity effect—standard definition video using full-body
frame was insufficient to detect the significant variation in head movement.
The left hand was similar to the head in that a post-hoc qualitative visual
review indicated that in most cases, the left hand exhibited much less variation in
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movement. There was no video focused in on the left hand, so it is not possible with
the current dataset to determine whether a rigidity effect was present in that hand.
The majority of movement throughout the CIT was in the right hand. No data
were collected on the handedness of participants, but based on general population
statistics one can estimate that about 90% of participants were right-handed. It
seems likely that even minor, random movements are most likely to be performed
by the dominant hand. Future research in this area may benefit from including
handedness in the explanatory or predictive model.

7.1.3 Experiment 1 Limitations and Future Research
The ~77% prediction accuracy of the rigidity effect reflected the ~77%
prediction accuracy of trained polygraph professionals. This was true in spite of the
fact that the professionals had more data to work with (i.e., the pre-CIT interview).
However, it is unclear if the portions of the interview prior to the CIT helped or
hindered the interviewer’s ability to make a judgment. Similarly, the interview
questions prior to the activity could have had some preparatory or dampening effect
on the CIT. Since the ultimate goal of this research is to move toward an automatic
human screening system, future research will need to investigate these factors and
determine how they might play a role.
In the same vein, the effects of the interviewer are unclear. Even though the
interviewer plays a minimal role in the CIT, it is possible that a human may
unconsciously send indicators to the examinee as to the critical item in a CIT foil,
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just as this study has shown that it is possible for the examinee to unconsciously
give away their own guilty knowledge. Factors such as interviewer gender, dress,
demeanor, timing, eye contact and other characteristics and behaviors could affect
the level of anxiety or perceived threat of the interviewee. Interestingly, when the
critical item in a foil was presented, increased rigidity in head movement was
present even among innocent participants, though to a lesser degree than among
guilty participants. Post-hoc analyses showed that this phenomenon was present
during all three CIT foils, though strong enough to be statistically significant only in
the third foil. Further exploration is needed to determine the source of this anomaly
and if it can be remedied using an automated interviewer such as a disembodied
voice or other conversational agent.
Finally, it is clear that technology and process improvements can and should
be made on this initial investigation. However a 77% accuracy rate is an
encouraging result for the first iteration. Future research should focus both on
improving the prediction capability of automated rigidity measurement, and
combining rigidity with other cues to concealed information for a more
comprehensive understanding of the interaction.

7.2 Experiment 2 Discussion
Experiment 2 also had two main goals. The first was similar to experiment 1 in
that it investigated and instantiated and alternative indicator of concealed
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knowledge, this time targeting oculomotor and response time indicators. Secondly it
allowed an evaluation of the performance of an instantiated automated human
screening system in the form of an ASK. This section will discuss the results of the
oculometric analysis; the next section will discuss the performance of the ASK
against the design criteria.

7.2.1 Experiment 2 Summary of Results
The results support the hypotheses that oculomotor defensive behavior
would be apparent in participants who possessed guilty hidden knowledge. As
predicted, participants carrying a mock IED tended to avoid gazing at foil items—
choosing to spend more time gazing at the center of the screen (i.e., the “safety
point”) where the expected visual stimulus was unrelated to the test. This effect
remained constant even on the second day of participation when participants were
familiar with the ASK.
The orienting response, traditionally measured in practice via monitoring
electrodermal activity, heart rate, and/or respiration, was somewhat effectively
measured using eye-movement patterns, as is commonly seen in cognitive
psychology research. Participants who carried the mock IED were more likely to
orient their initial visual attention toward the critical foil item presented by ASK.
However, this effect was seen only on the second day of participation.
Response time followed a slightly different pattern. All participants took
more time to respond to foils that contained critical items. This finding may be
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confounded by an ordering effect: the non-threatening foil always came first.
Participants may well have simply taken more time to respond during the first foil
than to subsequent foils.
Response time decreased on the second day, presumably because
participants were more familiar with the process and therefore required less highlevel cognition, or were able to use cognitive resources more efficiently. However,
guilty participants’ response time did not decrease on the second day when
threatening items were presented. This is somewhat consistent with previous
research that shows an increased response time when critical items are presented
(Seymour, et al., 2000). These results suggest promise for using this measure in
automated screening. However, because of limitations in the experimental design
and outstanding research questions regarding the easiness of countering this
measure (Gronau, et al., 2005), further research should be done before drawing
conclusions on the validity and reliability of response time for automated screening
systems.
Overarching the hypotheses was the proposition that a CIT-based system like
the ASK could be automated and extended to non-traditional domains for the
discovery of valuable concealed knowledge. While further research is needed to
refine the ASK design, the initial results are promising. The ASK operated
automatically, with little need for manual intervention, and utilized the CIT
framework to detect concealed information at a rate greater than chance and
unaided human judgment.
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7.2.2 Experiment 2 Contributions to Research and Practice
There are three major research contributions of this second study. This first
is the application of orienting and defensive response theories to automated
screening for concealed information. Second, oculomotor cues to concealed
knowledge were identified, and response time was investigated in this new
application. Third, these theories were successfully instantiated in an implemented
automated system, where further insights were gleaned beyond the hypotheses
specifically tested.
While the orienting reflex has been part of the traditional CIT since its
inception, defensive responding has not been a major focus of CIT research. In this
study orienting and defensive responding were measured simultaneously through
oculomotor indicators of concealed knowledge. Oculometric measures have been
used in research settings since 1902 and has recently found application in IS and
deception detection research. However, this study is among the first to use eye
movement as an indicator of concealed knowledge. The orienting reflex measure
used in this study (the direction of the initial saccade) is common to cognitive
psychology research in that eye focus is assumed to orient toward stimuli perceived
to be novel or personally significant. Detecting defensive responding via oculomotor
patterns, however, is an underexplored area. This study found strong effects of
defensive responding in eye movement patterns. These effects could also have
implications for eye tracking in human-computer interaction research, which tends
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to analyze what individuals do look at, when in fact what a person does not look at
may have more signal value if it is threatening in nature.

7.2.3 Experiment 2 Limitations and Future Directions
Order effects and stimuli type are an important limitation to consider in light
of the results of experiment 2. Some of the results were potentially confounded by
the fact that non-threatening foils were always presented first, rather than being
interspersed throughout the foils that contained threatening items. This seemed to
have an effect especially on response time. Future research should investigate order
effects further.
There were at least two areas for improvement regarding the modified CIT
used in this study. First, images may perform better than words as stimuli in this
system. Though the orienting reflex can occur prior to detection, it is unclear
whether four words can be subconsciously identified prior to the initial saccade.
Images may be more easily processed by parafoveal visual attention and thereby
may produce improved results. However, the color, tone, and type of images can in
and of themselves demand an orienting response, so careful selection and pretesting
of images would be an important step to take.
The second area for improvement involves a “hurry up” instruction.
Encouraging the participant to respond as quickly as possible should increase the
likelihood that eye movements will be reflexive rather than overt. An example
instruction that could be given at the beginning of the interaction is: “Please answer
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questions as quickly as possible. Extended hesitations may lead to additional
screening.” The orienting reflex is a reflex, and is probably more likely to influence
eye movement when that eye movement is not being consciously controlled.

7.3 Evaluation of ASK Design
The ASK system and associated process marks the beginning of iterative
research into human screening systems searching for concealed information. This
section discusses the various aspects of ASK in light of the design principles inspired
by the CIT.
The first two design principles are repeated below:
1. Identify appropriate stimuli that represent the concealed knowledge in
question. Ensure there is reasonably strong certainty that the
representation has relatively high personal significance for a person who is
concealing such knowledge.
2. Identify irrelevant stimuli that each arouse the same baseline level of
orienting and defensive responses.
The ASK process identified appropriate stimuli by selecting first the target
stimulus of interest (in this case, an explosive), then selecting and pretesting (via a
survey) items that produced a similar orienting response. High personal significance
of the critical item was ensured (manipulation checks supported this) because of the
controlled nature of the experiment.
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In a field implementation of ASK, selecting and pretesting items can be just as
simple to do. There is no way to be 100% certain of personal significance in a field
setting, but because the crime is in progress or planned, high personal significance
should be even more likely than what one would expect to see in criminal
investigations where the crime may be several months removed from the CIT being
performed.
3. Develop several foils consisting of relevant and irrelevant stimuli in a oneto-many ratio.
The foils used in ASK were an adaptation of the standard CIT such as the one
performed in experiment 1. The foils were presented visually and simultaneously.
Visual, simultaneous foils decreased the time necessary to conduct a screening and
seemed to elicit strong defensive responses, but further investigation is needed to
determine the most effective way for an ASK to present the foils.
4. Automatically present these foils in an environment free of potential
distractions, including but not limited to human distractions.
Distractions have potential to be problematic for a CIT because orienting and
defensive responses are sensitive to alternative stimuli. The ASK used in this study
was situated in a separate room where virtually no outside sound could be heard
and no interruptions would occur. In a field environment, a similar setup would be
ideal: a location free from alternative stimuli. This may mean a booth-like setup in a
rapid screening application or a separated office in a more investigative application.
A weakness of the ASK was it was not height or depth adjustable. Even
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though individuals sat down for the short screening process, the monitor and chair
often had to be manually adjusted to properly capture eye movement. An eye
tracking system that allows more freedom in head movement and/or an ASK that
has greater height and depth adjustability would be an important improvement to
ensure the best capture of oculometric data.
5. During foil presentation, automatically capture human indicators of the
orienting and/or defensive responses.
The ASK collected eye tracking, kinesic, and vocalic data, but required postprocessing to translate this raw data into usable indicators. Field implementations
of an ASK need indicators and risk assessments in near-real time. Foil segmentation
is one of the challenges to this design principle. All captured data needs to be
segmented temporally in order to understand which eye movement, body
movement, and so on is associated with which foil or foil item. For experiment 1 and
part of experiment 2, this segmentation process was done manually. The ASK in this
study did automatically segment the eye tracking data by allowing a set amount of
time for a response before moving to the next foil. The data for each succeeding foil
was tagged according to which time segment it fell under. Other methods that could
be used to segment data are through speech recognition or asking the examinee to
press a button when his or her response is complete.
6. Apply categorization algorithms to the collected data to assess concealed
knowledge.
The categorization algorithms performed on the data collected by the ASK
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exceeded chance levels, but require more sophistication and/or combination with
other measures to be viable for a field context. Additional non-invasive, non-contact
candidate measures may in include measuring uncertainty and stress via vocalic
analysis and measuring the orienting response with via pupillometry algorithms
applied to high-speed cameras.

7.4 Overall Key Contributions
This research shows that there is promise in extending the traditional
applications of concealed knowledge testing. The traditional CIT is a powerful
method for this type of knowledge discovery testing. In the traditional CIT, an
individual’s orienting response when presented with irrelevant stimuli is compared
to his or her response when presented with relevant stimuli. Traditionally, the CIT
protocol has not been widely adopted in practice, except in a small number of
criminal investigations (Japan being a notable exception, where it is more commonly
used). This study takes the first steps toward overcoming the barriers that have
prevented more widespread use in both criminal investigations and alternative
arenas. This is accomplished by designing the automated screening kiosk (ASK)
system to leverage the core principles of the CIT, while introducing alternative
measures that do not require human intervention.
Alternative or enhanced measures such as kinesic and oculomotor cues to
concealed knowledge can improve the portability and simplicity of the detection of

104

concealed knowledge, because they eliminate the need for specialized personnel or
invasive equipment. The non-invasive, low-cost nature of an ASK design may be a
welcome contrast to traditional techniques that use SCR, respiration, and heart rate
monitors, as well as more recent CIT techniques using fMRI, all of which can be
prohibitively expensive for widespread use in practice.
The positive results of this study suggest that a simple procedure could be
developed to complement screening at high risk locations such as airports, public
events, or border crossings. Unlike current screening systems which attempt to find
the threat itself (e.g. by checking x-ray images for shapes that look like weapons), an
ASK system may not identify the specific threat, but rather indicate that further
investigation is warranted. Adding an abstract layer to the screening system might
be comparable to an antivirus program that isn’t limited to searching for threats
that have signatures identified in the past, but also investigates program behaviors
that might indicate a need for a closer look.
The search for concealed information need not be limited to municipal
organizations. In locations where law allows, businesses can use an ASK system to
improve internal security or help prevent insecure behavior. For instance, an ASK
could determine which employees are most likely to be leaking sensitive company
information. An ASK interaction could also become part of a regular security policy
review course. Where an employee may not be willing to openly admit negligence or
mistakes with regard to secure behavior, an ASK could help discretely determine
which security protocols are likely to be a concern on an individual or aggregated
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level. An ASK could potentially apply to many situations where an organization
needs to know about specific events but its members are motivated to hide what
they know.
Even the traditional CIT as it is used today may also benefit from integrating
these additional indicators. While traditional measures rely exclusively on the
orienting response, the results of this study indicate that defensive responding can
also distinguish concealed knowledge from lack of knowledge, when that the
concealed knowledge in question is associated with a level of anxiety to the
examinee. Drawing from more than one underlying mechanism can make
countering a CIT more difficult. CIT practitioners and researchers can also use an
automated approach to control for interviewer effects.
As this work is expanded and refined, this proactive threat-detection system
can conceivably complement current physical security screening processes. Similar
to behavioral virus detection in virtual environments, screeners can use an ASK-like
system to detect threats or valuable concealed knowledge in a physical
environment—even if the specifics of the threat are unknown.
Though physical security was the chosen field of interest for this study, the
findings of this study can potentially extend to many similar applications, such as
internal fraud investigations, policy compliance examinations, and uncovering B2B
espionage. In each case, the ASK will need to be tailored to the situation at hand,
relying on the design principles put forth in this paper.
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8.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Several limitations of this study provide important opportunities for future
research. This original study is at the beginning of a stream of research that will
further investigate concealed knowledge detection. Among the limitations that need
to be addressed are the “witness” problem of the CIT, further refinement of the
process and system, and the potential for defeating countermeasures.
Distinguishing between guilty persons and innocent witnesses is an inherent
limitation of the CIT (Gamer, 2010). For instance, in a security screening scenario, it
is feasible to witness or to know about an illegal or improper activity, while not
having participated in the activity directly. For instance, an examinee may purposely
conceal knowledge that a friend is smuggling drugs or weapons through a screening
checkpoint, though the examinee may not be personally participating in the activity.
Further investigation of such guilty knowledge may or may not be desirable in that
situation. Though the current study did not address this limitation, future work
should assess how this witness problem may be minimized.
Future research will improve on the design principles of automated human
screening systems and the methods of measuring the orienting and defensive
responses. There are at least two possible reasons why the orienting reflex was not
as effective as expected. First, cognitive psychology research on the orienting reflex
usually includes instructions to the participant to respond as quickly as possible.
This additional instruction may facilitate the autonomic visual reflexes. A second
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possibility is that word-based cues require more peripheral attention processing
than relatively lower-level visual cues such as an image of an object. Future research
is needed to investigate these considerations.
Future research will also investigate additional non-invasive methods for
identifying concealed knowledge. Some promising potential technologies include
face movement analysis for detecting emotion, vocalic analysis for measuring voice
stress, pupillometry for measuring the orienting reflex, and linguistic analysis for
detecting strategic message manipulation.
Using several methods simultaneously may be critical for overcoming
countermeasures. Countermeasures are methods examinees use to “counter” or beat
the test system. Countermeasures have been shown to be somewhat effective
against the CIT and related veracity assessment techniques. There is some indirect
evidence that the use of multiple heterogeneous sensors designed to detect different
effects of concealed knowledge may help deter countermeasures (D. C. Derrick, et
al., 2010; Nunamaker, Derrick, Elkins, Burgoon, & Patton, 2011). A combination of
effective measures may make countermeasures much less effective, because an
individual’s limited cognitive capacity should hinder the number and type of
countermeasures that can be simultaneously employed.
The apparatus and sensors for a second instantiation of an ASK has already
been assembled and will soon be developed into a revised ASK. This second
iteration begins to address many of the limitations mentioned here. A description of
the second ASK iteration is found in Appendix A.
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Finally, it is important to note that a CIT screening system will likely never be
foolproof. Thus, its main contributions will be as risk assessment and decision
support, and as a means of automatically identifying extremes—those true who are
extremely likely and unlikely to be a concern. These objective assessments can free
up human resources to focus more time on those cases most likely to be a problem.
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9.

CONCLUSION

This research proposed, implemented, and evaluated a human screening
system design for the discovery of the presence of valuable concealed knowledge.
The ASK system design draws from psychology research on hidden information
discovery, improving on existing CIT research by detecting the orienting reflex and
defensive response non-invasively and automatically. To accomplish these goals,
alternative automated methods for detecting these underlying mechanisms were
tested and shown to have merit. A CIT screening system such as the ASK can
indicate the presence of potential threats or malintent even if a specific threatening
activity has not yet been tried before. The ASK system design also decreases the
need for specialized training and lengthy setup times. This work adds to concealed
knowledge detection research by introducing new oculometric and kinesic variables
as indicators of detecting guilty knowledge. An ASK system could serve as an
inexpensive first-level screening filter and also as a decision support system for
investigative activities in municipal and business settings.
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10. APPENDIX A: THE SECOND ASK ITERATION
A second instantiation of a screening system based on the ASK design
principles has already been assembled. This ASK is pictured below.

Figure 18. The second iteration of an ASK system.

This second iteration overcomes limitations of real-time feature generation by
using a Microsoft© KinectTM sensor to collect body movement data. The Kinect
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improves on previous methods by collecting data in real time rather than using
post-processing on traditional video. Rather than tracking positions of head and
hands only, the Kinect generates frame-by-frame positions of 20 points on the body.
The Kinect also tracks these points in three dimensions using a stereoscopic camera.
Basic software for capturing this data has been developed and can be found in
Appendix B along with sample data output. A force platform that independently
measures movement on the left- and right-hand sides of the body will also collect
kinesic data. These improvements will provide increased ability to measure rigidity
and also investigate additional kinesic cues to concealed knowledge.
The Kinect does not track facial movement, so the ASK includes a high
definition camera trained on the face and will incorporate facial movement tracking
software. A microphone for voice recognition and vocalic analysis is affixed. An eye
tracking system that collects blink, pupillometric, and eye movement data is also
included. The ASK has a touchscreen for tactile interaction and measurement.
The ASK is also placed on a reticulating arm, allowing the apparatus to be
adjusted to optimal height and depth for a given person and context. The ASK is
easily mounted to a wall or a pole and can be easily switched back and forth.
Alternate sensors can also be added or taken away with relative ease. The purpose
of this ASK is not to serve as a finished model, but as a configurable platform for
further iterations of human screening experimentation.
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11. APPENDIX B: CODE AND DATA SAMPLES FOR REAL-TIME
KINESIC DATA CAPTURE SOFTWARE
Below is some sample data that is generated by the ASK in real time using a
Microsoft Kinect sensor.

Time
Millisecond
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
39
6:16:08
54
6:16:08
54
6:16:08
54
6:16:08
54
6:16:08
54
6:16:08
54
6:16:08
54

SkeletonID
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

JointID
HipCenter
Spine
ShoulderCenter
Head
ShoulderLeft
ElbowLeft
WristLeft
HandLeft
ShoulderRight
ElbowRight
WristRight
HandRight
HipLeft
KneeLeft
AnkleLeft
FootLeft
HipRight
KneeRight
AnkleRight
FootRight
HipCenter
Spine
ShoulderCenter
Head
ShoulderLeft
ElbowLeft
WristLeft

JointX
0.06166497
0.05519164
0.06627864
0.07043894
-0.1033907
-0.1819153
-0.2609192
-0.3152553
0.2483098
0.3048614
0.3707651
0.4662179
-0.01831
-0.1087503
-0.1062556
-0.1400814
0.139947
0.1758052
0.1864027
0.1557258
0.06172369
0.05535929
0.06669749
0.07049168
-0.1037694
-0.2164899
-0.3423347

JointY
-0.1605196
-0.099904
0.2650657
0.4582048
0.140487
-0.07149
-0.2773067
-0.3335559
0.142146
-0.07658
-0.2923496
-0.5522138
-0.239352
-0.5795925
-0.8309524
-0.7488239
-0.2386055
-0.5844672
-0.8381631
-0.7717767
-0.1580266
-0.0981434
0.2651726
0.458257
0.1405163
-0.0815465
-0.2859718

JointZ
2.747354
2.804271
2.832123
2.821789
2.788962
2.764786
2.702001
2.660625
2.845469
2.828591
2.80153
2.788885
2.714637
2.655539
2.594287
2.603081
2.744128
2.648381
2.617846
2.610299
2.750765
2.807629
2.83489
2.825631
2.792696
2.755363
2.674932
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6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08
6:16:08

54
54
54
54
54
54
54
54
54
54
54
54
54

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

HandLeft
ShoulderRight
ElbowRight
WristRight
HandRight
HipLeft
KneeLeft
AnkleLeft
FootLeft
HipRight
KneeRight
AnkleRight
FootRight

-0.4394781
0.2491306
0.3247877
0.4464777
0.5711275
-0.018705
-0.110186
-0.105069
-0.1383674
0.1401658
0.1786352
0.2345826
0.1733328

-0.4457697
0.1425115
-0.0949460
-0.3118598
-0.5212782
-0.2374434
-0.5794815
-0.8564035
-0.7525697
-0.2364716
-0.5844484
-0.8585159
-0.8021312

2.640919
2.84924
2.829608
2.799425
2.79853
2.717973
2.658908
2.591405
2.603314
2.747092
2.649752
2.609676
2.610182

Figure 19. Sample Joint output (2 frames) from the Kinesic Real Time Data
Capture Software

Time
Millisecond SkeletonID JointX
6:16:08
39
4 0.042094
6:16:08
54
4 0.046264
6:16:08
86
4 -0.15867
6:16:08
117
4 -0.14502
6:16:08
148
4 -0.12311
6:16:08
195
4 -0.09961
6:16:08
210
4 0.193052
6:16:08
242
4 0.222623
6:16:08
273
4 0.235105
6:16:08
320
4 0.252239
6:16:08
351
4 0.272886
6:16:08
382
4 0.28863
6:16:08
429
4 0.313742
6:16:08
460
4 0.340276
6:16:08
491
4 0.377089

JointY
-0.24195
-0.2435
-0.27755
-0.27214
-0.2574
-0.25025
-0.17576
-0.17232
-0.16601
-0.16588
-0.15219
-0.149
-0.14663
-0.14295
-0.13771

JointZ
2.662193
2.664862
2.455804
2.438134
2.463184
2.464329
2.686492
2.689159
2.694462
2.697867
2.703254
2.707058
2.711317
2.718948
2.725929

Figure 20. Sample Skeleton Output (15 frames) from the Kinesic Real Time
Data Capture Software
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The sample code below shows how the above Microsoft Kinect data can be
collected for analysis.
Main Program File
using
using
using
using
using
using
using
using
using

System;
System.Collections.Generic;
System.Linq;
System.Text;
System.Threading;
System.Diagnostics;
Microsoft.Research.Kinect.Nui;
System.Windows.Forms;
System.Xml;

namespace KinectGetData
{
class Program
{

static string jointDataOutputPath = "";
static string skeletonDataOutputPath = "";
static Runtime nui = new Runtime();
static void Main(string[] args)
{
//get config settings
XmlTextReader reader = new
XmlTextReader("KinectGetData.exe.config");
XmlDocument xmlDoc = new XmlDocument();
xmlDoc.Load(reader);
jointDataOutputPath =
xmlDoc.SelectSingleNode("configuration/appSettings/JointDataOutputP
ath/text()").Value;
skeletonDataOutputPath =
xmlDoc.SelectSingleNode("configuration/appSettings/SkeletonDataOutp
utPath/text()").Value;
//start recording kinect data
Thread kinectDataCaptureThread = new Thread(new
ThreadStart(captureJointPoints));
try
{

using (System.IO.StreamWriter file = new
System.IO.StreamWriter(@jointDataOutputPath, true))
{
//write to file: quality measure (joint.W)
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currently does not work properly; so says Microsoft. I left it out.
file.WriteLine("Time, Millisecond, SkeletonID,
JointID, JointX, JointY, JointZ");
}
using (System.IO.StreamWriter file = new
System.IO.StreamWriter(@skeletonDataOutputPath, true))
{
//write to file: quality measure (joint.W)
currently does not work properly; so says Microsoft. I left it out.
file.WriteLine("Time, Millisecond, SkeletonID,
JointX, JointY, JointZ");
}
}
catch (System.IO.IOException)
{
System.Windows.MessageBox.Show("Error opening the
file for Kinect Data export.\nMake sure the output files are not
currently in use and restart the program.");
}
kinectDataCaptureThread.Start();

Thread.Sleep(1000 * 180);//3 minutes: change to match
experimental protocol
//TODO: shut down kinect data collection; save to file
kinectDataCaptureThread.Abort();

}
static void startApplication(string directory, string
filename)
{
System.IO.Directory.SetCurrentDirectory(directory);
Process p = new Process();
p.StartInfo.FileName = filename;
//p.StartInfo.Arguments = "";
p.Start();
}

public static void captureJointPoints()
{
try
{
nui.Initialize(RuntimeOptions.UseSkeletalTracking);
}
catch (InvalidOperationException)
{
System.Windows.MessageBox.Show("Runtime
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initialization failed. Please make sure Kinect device is plugged
in.");
return;
}
nui.SkeletonFrameReady += new
EventHandler<SkeletonFrameReadyEventArgs>(nui_SkeletonFrameReady);
Thread.Sleep(1000);//needs time to initialize or it
crashes for some reason. Hokey way to deal with this for now.
}
static void nui_SkeletonFrameReady(object sender,
SkeletonFrameReadyEventArgs e)
{
SkeletonFrame skeletonFrame = e.SkeletonFrame;
int iSkeleton = 0;

foreach (SkeletonData data in skeletonFrame.Skeletons)
{
if (SkeletonTrackingState.Tracked ==
data.TrackingState)
{
//capture overall center of mass for the skeleton
using (System.IO.StreamWriter file = new
System.IO.StreamWriter(@skeletonDataOutputPath, true))
file.WriteLine(DateTime.Now.ToLongTimeString()
+ ","+ DateTime.Now.Millisecond + "," + data.TrackingID +
"," + data.Position.X + "," +
data.Position.Y + "," + data.Position.Z);
// Save joints

foreach (Joint joint in data.Joints)
{
using (System.IO.StreamWriter file = new
System.IO.StreamWriter(@jointDataOutputPath, true))
file.WriteLine(DateTime.Now.ToLongTimeString() + "," +
DateTime.Now.Millisecond + "," + data.TrackingID + ","
+ joint.ID + "," +
joint.Position.X + "," + joint.Position.Y + "," + joint.Position.Z
);
// Console.Out.Write(joint.ID + "," +
joint.Position.X + "," + joint.Position.Y + "," +
joint.Position.Z);

}
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}
iSkeleton++;
} // for each skeleton

}
}
}

C# project settings file
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" DefaultTargets="Build"
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
<PropertyGroup>
<Configuration Condition=" '$(Configuration)' == ''
">Debug</Configuration>
<Platform Condition=" '$(Platform)' == '' ">x86</Platform>
<ProductVersion>8.0.30703</ProductVersion>
<SchemaVersion>2.0</SchemaVersion>
<ProjectGuid>E10B9616-3C49-4399-81F6-157F524CB0E5</ProjectGuid>
<OutputType>Exe</OutputType>
<AppDesignerFolder>Properties</AppDesignerFolder>
<RootNamespace>KinectGetData</RootNamespace>
<AssemblyName>KinectGetData</AssemblyName>
<TargetFrameworkVersion>v4.0</TargetFrameworkVersion>
<TargetFrameworkProfile>Client</TargetFrameworkProfile>
<FileAlignment>512</FileAlignment>
</PropertyGroup>
<PropertyGroup Condition=" '$(Configuration)|$(Platform)' ==
'Debug|x86' ">
<PlatformTarget>x86</PlatformTarget>
<DebugSymbols>true</DebugSymbols>
<DebugType>full</DebugType>
<Optimize>false</Optimize>
<OutputPath>bin\Debug\</OutputPath>
<DefineConstants>DEBUG;TRACE</DefineConstants>
<ErrorReport>prompt</ErrorReport>
<WarningLevel>4</WarningLevel>
</PropertyGroup>
<PropertyGroup Condition=" '$(Configuration)|$(Platform)' ==
'Release|x86' ">
<PlatformTarget>x86</PlatformTarget>
<DebugType>pdbonly</DebugType>
<Optimize>true</Optimize>
<OutputPath>bin\Release\</OutputPath>
<DefineConstants>TRACE</DefineConstants>
<ErrorReport>prompt</ErrorReport>
<WarningLevel>4</WarningLevel>
</PropertyGroup>
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<ItemGroup>
<Reference Include="Microsoft.Research.Kinect, Version=1.0.0.0,
Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35,
processorArchitecture=MSIL" />
<Reference Include="PresentationFramework" />
<Reference Include="System" />
<Reference Include="System.Core" />
<Reference Include="System.Windows.Forms" />
<Reference Include="System.Xml.Linq" />
<Reference Include="System.Data.DataSetExtensions" />
<Reference Include="Microsoft.CSharp" />
<Reference Include="System.Data" />
<Reference Include="System.Xml" />
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<Compile Include="Program.cs" />
<Compile Include="Properties\AssemblyInfo.cs" />
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<None Include="KinectGetData.exe.config" />
</ItemGroup>
<Import Project="$(MSBuildToolsPath)\Microsoft.CSharp.targets" />
<!-- To modify your build process, add your task inside one of
the targets below and uncomment it.
Other similar extension points exist, see
Microsoft.Common.targets.
<Target Name="BeforeBuild">
</Target>
<Target Name="AfterBuild">
</Target>
-->
</Project>
Configuration File
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
<configuration>
<appSettings>
<JointDataOutputPath>C:\ScreeningExperiment2\KinectData\JointData.c
sv</JointDataOutputPath>
<SkeletonDataOutputPath>C:\ScreeningExperiment2\KinectData\Skeleton
Data.csv</SkeletonDataOutputPath>
</appSettings>
</configuration>
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12. APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENT 2 FACES CIT ANALYSIS
Four of the five visual CIT questions for experiment two presented words as
stimuli. As an exploratory measure a fifth CIT foil was added. This final foil was
more visual in nature: four faces were presented on the screen, one of which would
have been significant only to a participant in the Guilty condition. There was no
individual baseline to compare with, but between subjects effects were determined
for each day using logistic regression models that specified the presence of hidden
guilty knowledge as the response variable. The logistic regression models for day 1
and day 2 both produce a Nagelkerke R2 of .16 and a Cox & Snell R2 of .12. Time
spent gazing at the center of the screen was significant on day 1 but not day 2. The
direction of the initial saccade was not significant. Response time was consistently
predictive across both days. The results of these models are shown in the table
below.

Table 11. Results of Logistic Regression Models for Faces Visual CIT Foil
Fixed Effects

Intercept
Time Viewing Center of
Screen
Initial Saccade Toward
Center of Screen
Response Time
Notes: ** p < .01; * p < .05

Day 1 Model

Day 2 Model

β

β

(S. E.)
2.580**
(.907)
-.076**
(.028)
.028
(.445)
-.638*
(.294)

(S. E.)
2.937**
(.901)
-.027
(.018)
-.003
(.499)
-.914**
(.325)
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The model for day 1 produced an AUC of .70; the model for day produced an
AUC of .72. ROC Curves for these models are displayed below.

Day 1

Day 2

Figure 21. ROC Curves for the CIT foil that used faces.
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